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The well-being of individuals, especially those who live close to subsistence,
depends importantly on the ability to make and execute intertemporal plans.
The world over, however, individuals close to subsistence appear to leave con-
sumption unsmooth, save at a low rate, or fail to use inexpensive agricultural
and health inputs.
While these observed choices may be optimal given the constraints that
individuals face and the incompleteness of markets, researchers have suggested
that they may be the result of self-control problems.1
In this paper, we investigate several potential sources of failure to pursue
intertemporal plans by studying why choices about future consumption are
revised. The paper makes two contributions. First, we test for the presence
of self-control problems using a novel and robust method. Second, we provide
a quantitative analysis of this and other motives for the adjustment of prior
choices.
Applied research typically models self-control problems as the result of
present-biased (quasi-hyperbolic) time discounting. This modelling strategy is
founded, in part, on evidence of non-constant time discounting. Several studies
can be interpreted to show that time discount rates decline as tradeoffs are
pushed into the temporal distance.2 In particular, many experimental studies
document “static” preference reversals: subjects choose the larger and later of
two rewards when both are distant in time, but prefer the smaller and earlier
one as both rewards draw nearer to the present.
Interpreted as present-biased time discounting and assuming time-separable
preferences, these static preference reversals imply time-inconsistency: the
choices (plans) that a person makes now about consumption at a later date
are different from the choices she would make when that date arrives.3 Self-
1Some of the seemingly puzzling evidence regarding intertemporal choices of the poor
were first summarised by Theordore Schultz in his 1979 Nobel Prize lecture and more re-
cently in Banerjee and Duflo (2011).
2Ainslie (1992), Thaler (1991) and Loewenstein and Elster (1992) provide reviews.
3Early contributions include Phelps and Pollak (1968), Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue
and Rabin (1999). See DellaVigna (2009) and Bryan, Karlan and Nelson (2010) for recent
1
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control problems and a demand for commitment may thus emerge.4
However, until recently there have been no studies in the literature of
whether static preference reversals are associated with time-inconsistency. To
our knowledge, Halevy (2015) is the sole experiment in which the revision of
previous decisions is a variable of interest. Augenblick et al. (2015) study
revision of prior choices, focusing on dynamic inconsistency in monetary ver-
sus real effort choices. Otherwise, existing work has either studied the static
preference reversals themselves, the stability of time preferences, or the rela-
tionship between static preference reversals and the demand for commitment.
While demand for commitment is, like time-inconsistency, a signature pre-
diction of (quasi-)hyperbolic discounting models, studies that focus on the
demand for commitment may understate self-control problems either because
commitment devices are poorly designed and thus not demanded (Beshears
et al., 2011) or because demand for commitment requires some sophistication
on the part of respondents: individuals who are na¨ıve about their self-control
problems should not want to limit their future choices.
Testing the central mechanism linking static preference reversals to self-
control problems – by investigating the correlation between them and the re-
vision of prior choices – is important because the static reversals can be driven
by different factors.5 For example, static preference reversals may reflect pre-
dictable changes in the marginal utility of consumption.6 Alternatively, static
preference reversals may reflect inattention, confusion about tradeoffs, or re-
sponses to perceived experimenter demands.7 Finally, even if preferences un-
reviews of empirical applications.
4Ashraf et al (2006), Duflo et al (2011), Dupas and Robinson (2011), Brune et al (2016).
5Halevy (2015) distinguishes between time-consistency, time-invariance, and stationarity,
making clear that static preference reversals are identified with non-stationarity but need
not imply time-inconsistency.
6This observation has been made by Andersen et al. (2008), Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012) and Ericson and Noor (2015), who note that proper inference about time discounting
requires information about the curvature of the utility function.
7Benjamin et al. (2013) document correlations among test scores, cognitive load, and
short-term patience.
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der commitment were well-described by changing time discount rates, simply
making a plan may limit self-control problems.8 Individuals making static pref-
erence reversals for any of these reasons need not exhibit time-inconsistency.
In addition, there may be other explanations for the revision of prior
choices. For example, individuals from close-knit communities in developing
countries are often obliged to share their income with relatives and friends,
and such social pressure may prevent individuals from pursuing privately op-
timal choices and the revision of previous decisions.9 Unexpected events could
also motivate revisions to otherwise optimal consumption paths. Finally, in-
dividuals could simply make mistakes in their original decisions, and seek to
revise them later. Our analysis explores the role of these three alternative
explanations.
From a policy standpoint, it is important to understand what drives revi-
sion behaviour because it will influence the design of commitment devices and
their welfare impact. If social pressure, shocks, or mistakes affect revisions,
then commitment devices could be designed either to shield resources from
one’s social network (while maintaining access for oneself), or to allow access
in case of emergency or error. In contrast, if self-control problems are im-
portant then commitment devices should protect resources from one’s future
self.
To assess the drivers of revision behaviour, we implement an artefactual
field experiment where the key dependent variable is revision of a previous
decision under commitment. Our sample consists of several hundred wife-
husband pairs in rural Malawi. We elicited intertemporal choices by adapting
Andreoni and Sprenger’s (2012) convex time budget method, with large real
8Making plans or setting goals can affect self-control and self-efficacy (Bandura 1997,
Ameriks et al. 2003). This idea is also consistent with economic models of costly self-
control such as Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), Ozdendoren et al. (2012), and Fudenberg and
Levine (2012), in which consumers may both seek commitment and, yet, not always exhibit
time-inconsistency.
9See, e.g., Platteau (2000), Maranz (2001), Anderson and Baland (2002), Ligon et al
(2002), Hoff and Sen (2006), Ashraf (2009), Baland et al (2011), Jakiela and Ozier (2011)
and Schaner (2015).
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stakes (roughly a month’s wages). Subjects made several choices regarding
an allocation of money to be disbursed at two points, 61 and 91 days, in the
future. A subset of these subjects was revisited some time prior to t = 61
and given the opportunity to revise the allocation between t = 61 and t = 91.
A measure of this revision is our dependent variable. We examine correlates
of this revision corresponding to each of the four potential determinants of
revision outlined above.
The experiment also provides a complementary test of quasi-hyperbolic
discounting models. In those models, average revisions toward sooner should
be larger when the time lag between the revision decision and the first dis-
bursement (t = 61) is sufficiently small. We randomised the number of days
prior to t = 61 when each subject had to make the revision decision.
Analysis of initial allocations indicates that they usually, but not always
adhere to the law of demand; individuals typically allocated more income to
later periods when offered higher rates of return to waiting. We interpret this
to indicate that most subjects understood the choices made but that some
preference reversals may simply reflect confusion. We also find that “static”
preference reversals are frequent, but only slightly more likely to be “present”-
biased (as opposed to “future”-biased).10
Turning to revision behaviour, we find that revisions are common, often
substantial in size, and shift money both sooner and later. We find some
evidence that time-inconsistency induces these revisions: subjects shift more
money toward sooner when: (1) their initial allocations are “present”-biased,
and (2) the time lag to disbursement is shorter (when the revision decision
is made six or fewer days prior to day t = 61). Importantly, the relationship
between “present”-biased and revisions toward sooner is concentrated among
individuals that do not exhibit anticipated changes in the marginal utility of
consumption. This finding is significant because it demonstrates, in a devel-
oping context, that predictable changes in the marginal utility of consumption
10This finding contrasts other studies using the multiple price list method, but is consistent
with Andreoni and Sprenger (2012).
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may drive the observed static preference reversals. Put differently, we find
evidence of a reason why not all “present”-biased preference reversals are the
result of time-inconsistency.
We find no evidence that social pressure affects revision decisions in a mean-
ingful way: respondents’ revisions are not much higher when one’s spouse’s
sooner allocations are larger than one’s own, or when they have many other
relatives in the village. We also find little evidence that shocks or financial
sophistication (a proxy for mistakes) strongly predict revisions (although the
impact is less precisely estimated).
The next section presents details of the experimental design, the sample of
participants and the experimental setting. Section 2 presents the theoretical
framework and derives the testable implications. Then, Section3 describes the
choices under commitment and the drivers of revision behaviour. Section 4
clarifies our contribution to the related literature, and section 5 concludes.
1 The Experiment
The experiment proceeded in two stages. In stage one, we elicited intertem-
poral choices under commitment. Husbands and wives each separately made
several independent choices about the allocation of a substantial amount of
money over time. Each choice was an allocation of an endowment between two
periods, one “sooner” and one “later.” In stage two of the experiment, some
households were revisited on a randomly selected day in the two weeks prior
to the arrival of the first disbursement of their money in the far period and
given an opportunity to revise their original far-period allocation. Surveys at
both stages measured household wealth, income, and expenditures as well as
the participants’ expectations for each of these variables.
5
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1.1 The Setting
Rural Malawi has a number of advantages as a setting for experimental
study of intertemporal choice. Most important, financial markets are thin
especially during the rainy season when the experiment was conducted. During
this lean period, study participants have virtually no cash, and borrowing is
not merely expensive but it is often impossible. Similarly, short-term saving
can be difficult due to limited access to banking institutions, and familial or
social demands for what appears like excess cash.11
This financial market incompleteness is important because it reduces smooth-
ing opportunities that confound efforts to elicit time preferences in developed
economies.12 When financial markets are thick and transaction costs low, an-
swers to the questions asked in typical time-preference experiments should, in
theory, reflect only the market rates of return participants face, and reveal lit-
tle about their preferences (Fuchs, 1982, Chabris, et al. 2008).13 Augenblick et
al. (2015) address this issue by giving respondents in a US university campus
choices over leisure that is hard to smooth instead of monetary prizes.
Our study location also has some disadvantages. Poor infrastructure makes
the logistics of a large-scale experiment challenging. In addition, participants
have low levels of formal education and may therefore find the experiment
difficult to grasp. We therefore evaluate the consistency of participants’ choices
with a basic prediction of standard models of economic decision-making: the
law of demand. The degree of consistency with the law of demand will provide
11In Malawian survey data, only 26 percent of respondents use a formal financial product,
and around 60 percent had never heard of a savings account (FinScope, 2008).
12Grain and other consumption goods in store are used to smooth consumption, but only
partially. We rely on the fact that stakes are high and that they involve cash.
13To illustrate, suppose that outside of the lab a participant can borrow or save at mar-
ket rate r without transaction costs. A typical experiment asks the participant to choose
between $x sooner or $ (1 + re)x later, where re is the rate of return implied by the later
option. The participant may view this as a choice between Option A, $x sooner and access
to the interest rate r and Option B, $ (1 + re)x later and access to the interest rate r. If
re > r, then the set of allocations under option B contains the set under option A, and
more. Thus, for any monotonic preference ordering, option B is preferred. Analogously, if
r > re then is A preferred.
6
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a measure of participants’ understanding of the trade-offs involved in their
decisions.
1.2 The Sample
Participants in the experiment were recruited in January and February
2010 from a population of rural households in central Malawi who were growing
tobacco as their main cash crop. Participants were a subset of respondents who
were participating in another simultaneous experiment on savings.14 To be
eligible for inclusion in this experiment, respondents had to be located within
25 kilometers of the town of Mponela, to facilitate our cash disbursements.
Due to our interest in interactions within the household, we further restricted
our sample to farmers who were part of a married couple.
These sample restrictions left us with 1,268 targeted households. A total of
1,071 households (84.4%) and 2,142 respondents were successfully interviewed
at baseline. A subset of 661 respondents (randomly selected from the full set
of baseline respondents) make up the stage two sample to be revisited.
Table 1 provides summary statistics of baseline survey responses. In the full
sample (Panel A), the median respondent is 46 years old, has 4 years of formal
education, lives in a village with 177 inhabitants, including four relatives other
than his or her spouse. When compared to typical households from low-income
countries, the households in the sample are poor and in the central Malawi
region we study, tobacco farmers have similar poverty and income levels to
those of non-tobacco-producing households.15 At the time of the baseline
survey, the median household in the household has a zero balance in formal
bank accounts, and the 90th percentile of the bank balance distribution is
14See the Online Appendix for further details on sampling and Brune et al. (2016) for
details on the broader study from which our study participants were drawn. We note that
the inclusion of a dummy indicating the treatment status in the savings experiment does
not change the results significantly.
15Based on our calculations from the 2004 Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS),
individuals in tobacco farming rural households in central Malawi live on PPP$1.48/day on
average, while the average for central Malawian rural households overall is PPP$1.51/day.
7
This	article	is	protected	by	copyright.	All	rights	reserved
Au
th
or
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
just 700 Malawi Kwacha (MK), or approximately US$4.67. Including the self-
reported value of assets, the median household held just 4,446 MK of wealth
and the 90th percentile held 25,800 MK. Because the baseline survey was
conducted during the rainy season, several months would elapse before the
cash crop or primary staple (maize) would be harvested in mid-April or early
May. As a result, the median household expects virtually no income between
the interview date and April 2010.
1.3 Implementation of Stage One
Figure 1 displays the timeline of the experiment. At the baseline interview,
the household head and spouse were physically separated. After demograph-
ics questions, each made 5 independent choices regarding the allocation of
2000MK between tomorrow (“sooner”) and 30 days from tomorrow (“later”).
Each participant was given a bowl containing 20 beans (tokens) and two
empty dishes, A andB. One token allocated to dishA corresponded to 100MK
tomorrow. One token allocated to dish B corresponded to 100MK ∗ (1 + r)
30 days from tomorrow, where r is the rate of return for waiting. The rate of
return took on 5 different values: 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 1.00. The rates of
return rose, in order, with each of the five allocation choices, and participants
knew the order before making any choices. For each rate of return, the partic-
ipant made an allocation of tokens to dishes, the tokens were translated into
Malawi Kwacha, and the total was written above each dish on a whiteboard.
The participant was then allowed to adjust the allocation. This process was
repeated until the participant was ready to make the next allocation.
After completing the first five choices, the participant answered a series of
questions from the baseline survey. Then, using the same elicitation method
with cup, beans, and dishes, the participant again made five independent
choices regarding 2000MK, while facing different rates of return for waiting.
This time, each of the five choices concerned the allocation of money between
60 and 90 days from tomorrow (the “far” time frame). Online Appendix Figure
8
This	article	is	protected	by	copyright.	All	rights	reserved
Au
th
or
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
1 presents a schematic of the allocation decision.
The interruption between the five choices in the near time frame and the
five choices in the far was intentional. We sought to avoid having participants
choose the same allocations in both frames simply for the sake of being (or
appearing) consistent. In addition, the order in which the time preference sec-
tions of the questionnaire were administered was randomly assigned between
households within clubs. With probability 1
2
, a participant was first presented
with the “near” time frame allocations; otherwise, the “far” allocations were
presented first. Controlling for order effects does not affect the results, and
the order in which time frames were presented does not predict choices.
Before making their choices, each participant was told that one member
of the couple would be randomly chosen to have one of his or her choices
implemented. The randomization was performed on site by rolling dice, and
it was designed to favor (with two-thirds probability) the far time frame to
have a large enough sample of stage two revisits. Implementation took the
form of a voucher, redeemable at a disbursement office set up for this purpose
in the nearest town, Mponela. The voucher indicated the allocation and was
issued to the member of the couple who was randomly chosen. The recipient’s
identity was established with a name and a fingerprint placed on the voucher.
We made key aspects of payment delivery symmetric between the “near”and
“far” time frames. In particular, we provided two vouchers, one for the
“sooner” period (either the day after the visit or 60 days from then) and
one for the “later” period (30 days from the day of the visit or 90 days from
then, depending on time frame) redeemable for cash at the disbursement of-
fice. This symmetry has advantages over a design where near payments are
made in cash during the experiment. That design could favor allocations to
the “sooner” period in the “near” time frame if participants mistrusted the ex-
perimenters or if the infrastructure in the area induced substantial transaction
costs to redeeming the “later” period voucher. A disadvantage of this symme-
try is that payments were available no sooner than one day after the choices
were made. Therefore, we cannot study preferences regarding consumption in
9
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the present. To the extent that changes in time discounting are largest when
tradeoffs are pushed just beyond the present, any relationships between choice
under commitment and revision behaviour should be attenuated.16
1.4 Implementation of Stage Two
Stage two of the experiment was only carried out with those households
whose randomly selected decision concerned an allocation in the far time
frame.17
In stage two, these households were unexpectedly revisited. The target
revisit date was randomly selected from the interval between 16 and 2 days
prior to day 61 (the first far-frame disbursement date). Revisits occurred even
if the household chose an allocation involving no disbursement of funds at day
61.18 Revisits occurred in March and April 2010.19
16This “front end delay” payment method has been used in the literature by Pender
(1996), Andersen et al (2008) and Bauer et al. (2010), among others.
17Recall that in stage one of the experiment, one of each household’s 20 decisions (10 of
the husband’s and 10 of the wife’s) was randomly selected to be implemented. If the selected
decision concerned an allocation in the near time frame (which happened with probability
one-third by design), the experimental intervention was completed for that household. The
chosen individual in the household redeemed the allocation and was not interviewed again.
18In all that follows, we focus on the randomly-assigned targeted lag (in days) to first
disbursement, since it is exogenous to farmer actions. We made the first attempt to revisit
each respondent on the date implied by the randomly-assigned target lag. In some cases, the
actual lag was shorter than the targeted lag, because some farmers could not immediately
be located. The actual lag is highly correlated with the target lag; the correlation coefficient
is 0.99. 84.9% of respondents were revisited with exactly the targeted lag, and 97.4% were
revisited no more than two days after their target date. The maximum difference between
target and actual lag is six days.
19In stage one, participants were told, “We will give you one voucher for the money that
you want sooner and one voucher for the money that you want later. Each voucher will
have a date written on it, you will not be able to change these dates and will not be able to
redeem the voucher before the date written on it.” Participants were not told that vouchers
might be replaced or reissued. This framing, followed by the unannounced opportunity to
revise the decision, may be perceived as deception. Inference in the experiment depends
on respondents being unaware of the potential revision opportunity. The prohibition on
deception in economic experiments derives in large part from circumstances where partic-
ipants are drawn from a common pool and take part in multiple experiments (Jamison et
al., 2008). The concern is that deception in one experiment will induce skepticism about
10
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At the revisit, the wife and husband were physically separated and a survey
of wealth, income, and expenditure was taken. Then, the participant whose
choice had been selected to be implemented was presented with a bowl with 20
tokens. This time, four dishes were placed in front of the participant: dishes
A,B,A′ and B′. Dishes A and B contained a total of 20 tokens reflecting the
participant’s original decision at baseline. Dishes A′ and B′ were empty. The
participant was told that the first set of dishes showed his or her baseline
choice; an allocation between what was effectively one to 16 days from the
revisit and 30 days thereafter. The participant was also reminded of the rate
of return for waiting that applied at baseline, and the tokens on dishes A and
B were translated into kwacha using whiteboards.
The participant was then asked to allocate the 20 tokens in the cup between
the empty dishes A′ and B′, with the same rate of return for waiting. The
allocation to the second set of dishes was again translated into kwacha and
the participant was asked if he or she wanted to adjust the allocation. This
process was repeated until the participant indicated he or she was finished.
Then a new set of vouchers were issued (regardless of whether the allocation
was revised), and the interview was concluded. Appendix Figure 2 presents a
schematic of the revising procedure.
Because we sought to measure revisions of prior choices, we made the
original allocation decision salient and unambiguous. This procedure is also
designed to balance the consequences of implicit experimenter demands. The
participant must actively choose an allocation by placing tokens in the dishes,
and the status quo is thus discouraged. The mere fact that we revisited the
household and allowed a revision might also imply that some change is ap-
propriate. However, because the original allocation is set out just next to
new allocation, there should be no difficulty replicating the original allocation
and perhaps some mild, implicit encouragement to do so. Given the difficulty
of double blind protocols in this field setting, we cannot hope to eliminate
the experimenters’ “real´’ intent and affect behaviour in later experiments. The participants
in this field experiment are not part of such common pool.
11
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the consequences of implicit experimenter demands. Instead we designed the
experiment to limit the biases they might generate.
A key element of the revisit is that participants recall the allocation they
chose at baseline. The experiment therefore does not seek to study the stabil-
ity of preferences after a fixed time delay (as in Harrison et al 2005). If that
were the goal, we would not have reminded participants of their original choice
and we would have repeated the elicitation method after a fixed delay. Our
decision to make the allocation chosen at baseline salient also implies that the
choice made at the revisiting stage is deterministic in a way that the baseline
choices were not. The choice made at the revisiting stage will be implemented
with certainty, while only one baseline choice (selected at random) was imple-
mented. This difference in the choice setting may attenuate the underlying
relationship between baseline choices and choices at revisiting.
The two randomizations carried out in stage one generated exogenous vari-
ation in two independent variables of interest in the regression analysis. First,
the implemented choice generated exogenous variation in the interest rate that
applied to the revision decision. Second the targeted revisit date, generated
exogenous variation in the time to first disbursement. Consistent with the
fact that these two variables were randomly assigned, both the implemented
interest rate and targeted days to first disbursement are for the most part
uncorrelated with key baseline respondent and household characteristics. (See
Section 3.1 of the Online Appendix for further details.)
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section we develop a theoretical framework to aid interpretation
and the definition of measures used to analyse the revision behaviour.
We model participants’ choices in stage one as solving a problem that is
simple but sufficiently flexible to allow static preference reversals both due
to changing time discount rates (quasi-hyperbolic discounting) and due to
12
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time-specific marginal utilities of consumption. We define U1 (c) , utility from
consumption over four periods as follows:
U1 (c) = u1(c1) + β ∗
4∑
τ=2
δτ−1uτ (cτ ).
The familiar “β − δ” formulation of the utility function allows static pref-
erence reversals if β 6= 1. This formulation of utility also allows for a certain
form of time-dependence. While utility is separable in consumption across
periods, the marginal utilities of consumption may depend on time (thus the
time subscript s on us (·)). This captures the possibility that consumption has
different marginal value at different times.
Abstracting from the discrete choice set of the experiment, we can interpret
the stage one decisions about the “near” time frame as solving
max
c1,c2∈R+
u1(c1) + βδu2(c2) (Near)
subject to c2 ≤ (2000− c1)(1 + r)
for each rate of return r and assuming an endowment of 2000MK. Similarly,
decisions about the “far” time frame solve
max
c3,c4∈R+
βδ2u3(c3) + βδ
3u4(c4) (Far)
subject to c4 ≤ (2000− c3)(1 + r).
Interior solutions to these two problems satisfy the first-order conditions
u′
1
(c∗
1
) = (1 + r)βδu′
2
(c∗
2
) (FOC Near)
u′
3
(c∗
3
) = (1 + r)δu′
4
(c∗
4
). (FOC Far)
This formulation is useful as it allows two distinct sources of static pref-
erence reversals but additional assumptions on the functional form of utility
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are necessary for choices to identify discount factors in problems (Near) and
(Far).20
We now turn to the choices in stage two of the experiment. If the revisit
is sufficiently close to period 3 then the respondent solves
max
c3,c4∈R+
Urevisit(c3, c4) = u3(c3) + βδu4(c4)
subject to c4 ≤ (2000− c3)(1 + r).
Interior solutions here satisfy
u′
3
(c˜∗
3
) = (1 + r)βδu′
4
(c˜∗
4
). (1)
Recall, the solution to the stage one problem (Far) satisfied
u′
3
(c∗
3
) = (1 + r)δu′
4
(c∗
4
).
Thus, abstracting from uncertainty, social pressure, and mistakes, if time dis-
counting is exponential (β = 1) then the respondent will not revise (c˜∗
3
= c∗
3
) .
If instead the respondent is ‘`present´’ -biased (β < 1) then behaviour is time-
inconsistent c˜∗
3
> c∗
3
. Analogously, if (β > 1) then c˜∗
3
< c∗
3
.
2.1 The Tests
This deterministic analysis suggests the following two tests of non-constant
time discounting.
Test 1 If the respondent exhibits static, “present” -biased preference reversals
in stage one, and thus appears to have β < 1, she will shift more consumption
toward sooner upon revisiting. Similarly, if the respondent exhibits static,
20More formally, for any u1, u2, βδ that can reconcile choices regarding the near term,
there exists another u˜1, u˜2, β˜δ that can do so as well and therefore once needs additional
assumptions on the functional forms to identify β, δ and the curvature parameters of the
utility function.
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future-biased preference reversals in stage one and thus appears to have β > 1,
she would shift more consumption toward later upon revisiting.
Test 2 If the revisit occurs sufficiently close to the date of first disbursement
(period 3 in the above framework) then first order condition (1) applies and
present (or future) bias will be evident in a revision toward sooner (later). If
instead the revisit falls far before the date of first disbursement, then first order
condition (FOC Far) continues to apply and the model predicts no revision.
2.1.1 Random Choice
Test 1 is appropriate if one assumes that choice data are dictated by the
deterministic model above, and so the difference between the choice and the
model’s prediction (or error) is interpreted as an unobserved determinant of
preferences. If, however, we allow for error in the implementation of “true”
preferences, estimates of the empirical model may exaggerate the correlation
between static preference reversals and time-inconsistency.
To see why, consider an extreme version of that error: a respondent that
makes allocations completely at random both in stage one and at the revisit.
Now consider choices exhibiting “present”-bias. By definition, the allocation
to sooner in the far time frame is lower than for the near time frame. When
choice is entirely random, therefore, the individual will, on average, allocate
more tokens to sooner upon revision. In this way, participants appearing
“present”-biased due to implementation error are mechanically more likely to
revise towards sooner.21 An analogous effect applies to future-biased static
preference reversals and revisions toward later.
21Consider the following numerical example with interest rate r = 10%. An individual
that appears “present”-biased randomly allocates 1000 to sooner and 1100 to later in the
near time frame and 600 to sooner and 1540 to later in the far time frame. Note that since
the individual appears “present”-biased, the allocation to sooner in the far time frame has
to be smaller than the allocation to sooner in the near time frame. In our example, the
allocation to sooner is 600. But because this allocation to sooner will tend to be small,
the probability that more tokens will be randomly allocated to sooner upon revisit is high,
and therefore individuals that appear “present”-biased mechanically will be more likely to
allocate more tokens to sooner upon revision.
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We tackle this confounding effect due to implementation error in our analy-
sis of Section 3 by constructing measures of “present” or future bias only from
the stage one choices that were not implemented. If implementation errors
are independent of each other, then measuring the tendency for static pref-
erence reversals from the non-implemented choices will break the mechanical
relationship between reversals and time-inconsistency in the experiment.22
2.1.2 Time-specific marginal utilities
Alternatively, while Test 1 assumes that static preference reversals are
only due to non-constant time discounting, they can also emerge from time-
specific marginal utilities of consumption, which may be relevant in Malawi.
For example, the marginal utility of consumption may be especially high at
the time of tilling or harvest (when farmers need more calories to maintain
work effort) or during the period immediately prior to harvest (when caloric
consumption is low).
To illustrate, suppose time discounting is constant (β = 1) but “flow” util-
ity is a function of time. Suppose, in particular, that utility is iso-elastic and
varies only across, but not within, time frame:
uτ (cτ ) =
c1−στ
1− σ
for τ = 1, 2 and uτ (cτ ) =
c1−ρτ
1− ρ
for τ = 3, 4 (2)
σ, ρ ≥ 0.
Interior solutions to stage one problems (FOC Near) and (FOC Far) imply
(
2000− c∗
1
c∗
1
)σ
=
(
2000− c∗
3
c∗
3
)ρ
If optimal consumption (weakly) rises within time frame (i.e. (1 + r) ≥ δ),
then respondents with a higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution in the
22See Section 4 of the Online Appendix for simulations that illustrate the consequences
of using only non-implemented choices to measure a participant’s tendency to make static
preference reversals.
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“far” time frame will exhibit a “present”-biased static preference reversal and
thus appear less patient in the “near”.23 Similarly, if the participant has a
higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution within the “near” time frame
(σ < ρ) then c∗
1
< c∗
3
. Such a participant would not revise his or her original
allocation (and thus would not exhibit time inconsistency) because the first
order condition for the stage one problem (FOC Far) is the same as that of
the revisit problem (1).
While this example relies on special functional forms, the insight is general.
Differences in the curvature of flow utility across time frames can induce static
preference reversals that are not driven by time inconsistency.
We accommodate this in our empirical analysis of Section 3 by identifying
respondents who show differences in curvature across time frames and by al-
lowing them to have a different correlation between static preference reversals
and revisions of prior choices.
3 Results
We begin with an analysis of whether intertemporal choices are consistent
with the law of demand and the prevalence of static preference reversals in
stage one choices. We thus use all the 2,142 observations available. We then
turn to stage two choices only available for the 661 individuals that were
revisited.
3.1 Adherence to the Law of Demand
The additive separability and monotonicity of the flow utilities assumed in
Section 2 above makes the strong prediction that if participants solve problems
(Near) and (Far), then the allocation to the later period, measured in kwacha,
23More formally, if (1 + r) ≥ δ and σ > ρ then c∗1 > c
∗
3.
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should increase with the rate of return to waiting r.24
We use the degree of consistency with this prediction of standard theory
as a metric for judging the appropriateness of simple economic models to
interpreting choices in the experiment: if choices are inconsistent with the law
of demand, either poor participants did not understand the trade-offs involved,
or standard economic models have little validity in this setting.
We evaluate adherence with the law of demand by dividing each partici-
pant’s ten decisions into pairs, where each element of the pair is an allocation
over the same two dates. The first element of the pair is the allocation to
later when facing rate of return r. The other element is the allocation to later
when facing the next lowest rate of return, r′. For each participant there are
eight such pairs, four for each of the two time frames. Out of 17,136 such pairs
in the data, in 13,859 pairs the allocation to the later period increased with
r. Thus, 81% of pairs were consistent with the law of demand. The median
violation is moderate in size in the sense that it could be made consistent with
monotonicity with a reallocation of less than two tokens.25
Becker (1962) indicates that adherence with the law of demand is not a
particularly stringent test of rationality because even random choice will, on
average, obey the law of demand. We therefore compare the share of consistent
24To see why, think of 1
1+r
as the price of consumption later in terms of consumption
sooner. When r goes up, the price of later consumption goes down. The result is an income
effect creating incentives to increase consumption in both periods, and a substitution effect
that is positive for consumption in the later period. Thus both income and substitution
effects lead to increased consumption in the later period. The near allocation, on the other
hand, can go up or down depending on whether the income or substitution effect dominates.
25A comparison with existing studies in developed countries is informative as we are not
aware of similar statistics being provided in studies based in developing countries. For
example, in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), the percentage of individuals that would have
six or more consistent pairs of choices is 92% (using the later allocation). According to
Table 2, the percentage in this experiment is somewhat lower at 76%. Similarly, using a
multiple price list elicitation format Meier and Sprenger (2015) found that only 11% of a
U.S. based sample exhibited multiple switch points and thus violated monotonicity – though
studies of risk preferences have exhibited much higher rates of violation (e.g., Jacobsen and
Petrie, 2009) than what we observe. Finally, while the published statistics are not directly
comparable, the U.S. based subjects in Augenblick et al. (2015) also appear to adhere to
the law of demand at higher rates than those in our study.
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pairs we observe in the experiment with the share generated from a simulation
where the same-sized sample makes choices purely at random (see Section 4 of
the Online Appendix for details). In the simulation 57% of pairs are consistent
with the law of demand.26 While substantially lower than the average rate
of consistency in the experiment, this simulation suggests some caution in
interpreting the choices as resulting from simple optimization and motivates
disaggregated analysis.
Indeed there is important heterogeneity in consistency with the law of
demand. Table 2 presents the distribution of participants by the number of
times (out of eight) they increased their later allocation with a single increase
in the rate of return r. Column 1 shows that, measured this way, 31.3% of
participants are always consistent and 75.7% are consistent at least in 6 out of
8 allocations. At the other end of the spectrum, 10.2% of the sample violated
this form of consistency in at least 4 allocations.27
In sum, these levels of consistency with the law of demand suggest that
many, but not all, participants understood the trade-offs they were facing and
that, for this majority, their violations of monotonicity might be attributed to
occasional “trembles” in the allocation process.
Further examination of decisions in stage one reported in Table 3 reveals
that choices are usually in the interior of the budget set. For example, at
a 50% rate of return to waiting, the median allocation to later is 1,950MK
and 700MK to sooner. A minority of allocations (12% to 23%) are “corner
solutions.” The high frequency of interior allocations is consistent with partici-
pants not having adequate tools outside the experiment to facilitate consump-
tion smoothing, and also points (in the absence of very high time discount
rates) to the importance of diminishing marginal utilities of consumption.
Another important feature of this distribution of stage one allocations is
26In contrast to the actual data, the median violation in the simulation of random choice
could be made consistent with an allocation of 6 tokens.
27Column 2 reports the simulated distribution of consistent choices if participants were to
choose consumption randomly. Virtually no-one is always consistent under random choice
and only 16.9% are consistent in at least 6 out of 8 allocations.
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the heterogeneity in the willingness to wait in exchange for a larger reward.
For example, for “later” allocations in the “near” time frame, at a 25% rate
of return, the 10th percentile is 750MK, while at the 90th percentile it is the
entire endowment. This heterogeneity is somewhat predictable with observ-
able subject characteristics. Regression analysis in Section 3.2 of the Online
Appendix reveals that those with more wealth at baseline allocate more to
later, as do those with more relatives who live in the village.
3.2 Static Preference Reversals
Table 3 shows a remarkable stability across time frames. The distribution
of allocations to later is not dramatically altered by the change from the “near”
to “far” time frame. For example, the mean allocations to later at the 25%
rate of return are 1,536MK and 1,565MK in the “near” and “far” time frames,
respectively. We find, however, that this average stability obscures substantial
volatility of individual choices across time frames and masks heterogeneity in
individual tendencies to shift allocations forward or back, depending on the
frame.
Each participant makes five pairs of decisions where each element of a
pair differs only in time frame. Of all 10,710 such pairs, just 2,927 (27%)
are identical and just 4,895 (46%) differ by a token or less. Thus, in more
than half of all such pairs the elements are substantially different from one
another. There is a modest tendency for these static preference reversals to be
“present”-biased. Of the 5,815 pairs that differ by strictly more than a token,
3,061 (53%) allocate more to the sooner date in the near time frame. The
remaining 47% allocate more to the later date in the near time frame.28
These patterns in stage one indicate that static preference reversals are
common and that “present” -biased reversals are only somewhat more com-
mon. While the distribution of these static reversals is roughly symmetric
28In the simulation of random choice, 4.77% are equal, 13.85% differ by one token or less,
and preference reversals are equally split between present and future biased (43% each).
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around consistency, there is evidence that they are not just the result of ran-
dom trembles. Among those participants who exhibit static reversals, 18% is
“present”-biased in at least four of five decisions. Simulations of purely ran-
dom choice indicate that the percentage of individuals with at least four of five
“present” -biased pairs would be about 8%. The tendency to be consistent or
“present”-biased is also somewhat predictable with observable characteristics
of the participants.
Table 4 presents regression results that relate a participant’s tendency to be
consistent or “present”-biased to observable characteristics. In each column
the dependent variable is either the fraction of pairs of decisions in which
the participant was dynamically consistent or the fraction the participant was
present-biased. Column 1 indicates that males and those with greater maize
stores tend to be more dynamically consistent. Column 3 reveals that these
variables have similar relationships (with opposite signs) with fraction present-
biased, though these relationships are not statistically significant. Indeed, the
reported p-value in the last row suggests that household characteristics are
jointly insignificant except for column 1.
Columns 2 and 4 reveal however two important relationships. First, there
is a strong association between adherence to the law of demand (Section 3.1)
and static preference reversals.29 Greater adherence to the law of demand
is associated with more dynamically consistent choices. This suggests that
for many the tendency to exhibit static preference reversals may be due to
a poor understanding of the choice environment. Second, there is a strong
association between being more responsive to the interest rate in the far time
frame and present-biased static preference reversals. As explained in Section
??, below, this is what we would expect if some respondents exhibit static
preference reversals because their marginal utilities of consumption depend on
29There is no mechanical reason why these two measures must be linked. The first regards
the response of allocations to changes in within time frame. The second regards consistency
of allocations across time frames. For example, a subject who always violated the law of
demand could be perfectly dynamically consistent, simply by replicating his non-monotonic
allocations in both time frames.
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time. We investigate this possibility, as well as the role of confusion about the
experiment, in our analysis of stage two revision behaviour below.
3.3 Revision Behaviour
Before studying the determinants of revision behaviour, we first describe
basic features of the choices upon revisiting. Recall that stage two of the
experiment applies only to those households whose randomly selected choice
was an allocation between 61 and 91 days from the baseline interview. We
aimed to revisit 722 respondents and we successfully collected revision choice
data from 661 (91.6%).
Revisions are common. While their original choice was clear and salient,
65% of participants (432) made some adjustment to that decision. Implicit
experimenter demands may have caused some participants to feel as though
some change was expected of them. A large majority (87%) made a reallo-
cation involving a shift of at least two tokens, and 64% made a reallocation
involving a shift of at least 4 tokens. Appendix Figure 3 presents a histogram
of changes in the participants’ allocations to sooner (t = 61) upon revisiting,
excluding those who made no change (35% of observations), illustrating the
frequency of relatively large revisions.
Furthermore, revisions shift the allocation of income forward and backward
in time with nearly equal frequency. Of the 432 participants who made some
revision, 52% shifted income toward sooner and 48% shifted income toward
later. As the histogram also indicates, the revisions toward later tended to
be more modest in size. Of these, approximately 56.5% involve the shifting
of at least 4 tokens, and just 15.5% involve shifting 10 tokens or more. The
comparable figures for revisions toward sooner are 70.2% and 25.8%.
Table 5 presents the results of ordinary least-squares regressions relating
revision behaviour to potential determinants of revision. The dependent vari-
able is the change in sooner allocations upon revisiting (in MK).30
30In Appendix Figure 2’s example, the dependent variable would take the value 200, as
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In column 1, independent variables are restricted to baseline character-
istics and the implemented interest rate. Respondents appear to revise less
towards sooner at higher rates of return: the coefficient on the interest rate
is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. Males and younger
individuals (those aged 56 or below) revise more towards sooner, while more-
educated individuals (primary and more than primary) revise less towards
sooner. Characteristics of the respondent’s spouse, and baseline maize stores
and wealth add relatively little explanatory power. With evidence on these
basic correlates of revisions, we now turn to Tests 1 and 2.
Test 1 evaluates “present”-bias as the source of static preference reversals.31
We construct a non-parametric measure based on the number of times that
a respondent made a “present”-biased preference reversal in stage one.32 We
account for the effects of implementation error (see Section 2.1.1) by taking
just four of the five pairs of decisions where each element of a pair differs only
in the time frame (excluding the pair associated with the implemented interest
rate), and calculating the fraction of those four pairs in which the participant
exhibited “present”-biased static preference reversals.33
As discussed in Section 2.1.2, static preference reversals can also be driven
by changes in the marginal utility of consumption. We therefore construct a
non-parametric measure of across-time-frame differences in the curvature of
utility based on the average responsiveness to the interest rate of the share of
two tokens were added to the time t dish compared to the original allocation.
31In the interest of brevity, we focus here on the test for β ≤ 1 and leave analysis of future
bias to Section 3.4 of the Online Appendix.
32An alternative approach would parameterise the utility functions in problems (Near)
and (Far) and estimate individual-specific parameters. We pursue this method in Section
3.8 of the Online Appendix.
33To allow for respondent error, we consider it a reversal only if the allocations differ by
two tokens or more. Results are very similar if we reduce the tolerance to just one token.
In addition, Appendix Table 3 provides results where our preferred measure is replaced on
the right-hand-side with the fraction of all five pairs of choices (including the one associated
with the implemented interest rate) in which the respondent exhibited a “present” -biased
static preference reversal. Coefficient estimates on fraction present-biased are, as expected,
larger in magnitude than those of Table 5.
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consumption allocated to later for each time frame f ∈ {near, far}:
ε¯f =
1
4
1.0∑
r=0.25
εrf .
Here, εrf is the change in the share of consumption allocated to later in time
frame f associated with the incremental increase in the rate of return to r.34
We use εrf instead of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,
d ln
(
ct+1
ct
)
dr
( 1
σ
or 1
ρ
in example 2) because the latter is undefined for corner solutions
and, in practice, the two measures are so well correlated that, among those
with interior solutions, the two produce quantitatively very similar results.
Then, we take the difference in the average responsiveness across time frames,
△ε¯f ≡ ε¯far − ε¯near. When △ε¯f is large it indicates that the respondent was
more responsive to the rate of return, and thus exhibited less curvature in
flow utility, in the far time frame.35 If such respondents also exhibit present-
biased preference reversals, those reversals would not be explained by changes
in the marginal utility of consumption but instead point to time-inconsistent
preferences.
The importance of hyperbolic discounting for revision could be understated
if “present” -bias is positively correlated with an overall reluctance to delay
consumption. If so, “present” -biased static preference reversals would be
positively correlated with larger initial allocations to sooner that, by definition,
leave less room for revisions toward sooner. We therefore also condition on
34Thus, if ℓrf denotes the share of consumption allocated to later in time frame f when
the rate of return is r, then
εr′f =
ℓr′f − ℓrf
r′ − r
.
The smallest incremental increase in the interest rate is 0.15, so εrf can range from ±6.67.
35Among the respondents who were revisited, △ε¯f ranges from −2.10 to 2.33 with a
median of 0.00 and a mean of 0.01. To reduce the confounding influence of implementation
error in responses, we create an indicator variable equal to one if △ε¯f > 0.1, and zero
otherwise. This classifies 33% of the revisited sample as “more elastic” in the later time
frame. Using a continuous measure of the across time frame difference in the responsiveness
to the interest rate yields very similar conclusions, but with less precision.
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a non-parametric measure of patience: fraction of tokens allocated to sooner,
across 9 baseline allocations (out of 10), excluding the implemented choice.
Column 2 of the table shows initial results of Test 1. The results are consis-
tent with the model outlined in Section 2 where respondents are heterogeneous
in both β and in the time-dependence of flow utility. The coefficient on the
main effect of fraction present biased is positive, and statistically significantly
different from zero at the 5% level. This effect, however, only exists for indi-
viduals that do not appear systematically more elastic in the “far” time frame.
Summing the coefficients on the main effect, the indicator for “more elastic in
the far time frame” 1(△ε¯f > 0.1) and on the interaction of fraction “present”-
biased with the indicator, we see that those who are more elastic in the far
time frame are, on average, time-consistent (the sum of the coefficients is not
statistically significant, p-value = 0.29).
Test 2 exploits the randomised revisit date. Column 2 also includes on the
right-hand-side of the regression an indicator for the targeted lag to first dis-
bursement being less than or equal to six days.36 Here the prediction is robust
to concerns about time-dependence of marginal utility. If individuals have hy-
perbolic preferences (β < 1), they will shift more towards the present if they
are sufficiently close to the time of consumption. We chose an indicator of six
days or less, which captures a third of the revisited sample, in order to balance
concerns about power (which might argue for a linear target lag specification)
against the prediction of a non-linear relationship between targeted lag and
revision that comes from a model of quasi-hyperbolic time discounting.
The estimates in column 2 provide evidence consistent with quasi-hyperbolic
time discounting among some respondents. The coefficient on the indicator for
six or fewer days to first disbursement is positive and statistically significant at
the 5% level. In addition, as expected, the non-parametric measure of general
impatience is negatively correlated with revisions toward sooner. Inclusion of
36Section 3.3 of the Online Appendix shows that alternate (in particular, linear) specifi-
cations of the target lag yield similar results, and that a highly flexible specification of the
target lag suggests that the step-function we use at six days is a reasonable approximation.
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this control has little effect on other regression coefficients.37
3.4 Other Motives for Revision
In column 3 we add to the regression variables measuring financial sophis-
tication and proxying for mistakes in initial allocations. We examine whether
these indicators of error predict revisions, and whether a correlation between
these measures and preferences in stage one explain the latter’s correlation
with revisions. The coefficients on these variables are typically negative, sug-
gesting that those with greater sophistication tend to revise toward later. But
the standard errors on these estimates are large, and we cannot reject a null
hypothesis of large effects (either positive or negative). A joint significance
test yields a similar conclusion.
As discussed in Section 3.2 there is a negative correlation between adher-
ence to the law of demand and static preference reversals. However, including
the measure of adherence to the law of demand has virtually no effect on the
point estimates of the relationship between “present” -biased static preference
reversals and revision behaviour. There is therefore no evidence that this link
between stage one preference reversals and revisions is driven by a relationship
between the preference reversals and mistakes.
In column 4 we add variables representing shocks experienced since the
baseline survey. Coefficients on death in the family and on shortfall in expected
income have the expected negative signs. Again, the standard errors are large
and we cannot reject a null hypothesis of large coefficients.38 Inclusion of these
37In results available upon request, we also estimate a specification that includes a triple
interaction term allowing the effect of distance to first disbursement to differ by both fraction
present-biased and the indicator for more being elastic in the far period. The statistical
significance of the previously discussed coefficients does not change in this specification;
the magnitude of the coefficient on the fraction present-biased increases somewhat. The
coefficient on the triple interaction term is positive, consistent with a larger effect of distance
to first disbursement among those who are more present-biased and more elastic in the far
period, but not statistically different from zero.
38Deaths affect approximately 2% of households, and shocks to income tend to be small.
Households expected virtually no cash income over this period. Care should therefore be
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shock variables has little impact on other regression coefficients.
In column 5, we add to the regression measures of social pressure. The first
variable is one’s spouse’s allocation to sooner minus one’s own, averaged across
the 9 baseline allocations (out of 10), excluding the implemented choice.39
This variable should capture pressure to revise one’s allocation toward sooner
coming from one’s spouse. Initial allocations were made without consulta-
tion between spouses, but there was ample opportunity to express preferences
regarding the implemented allocation (and, implicitly, alternatives) after the
allocation was revealed and vouchers issued, and before the revisit. More-
over, even though the initial allocations were made privately, one choice from
each spouse was selected for potential implementation and then a dice roll in
the presence of both spouses determined which allocation was actually imple-
mented.40 The second variable is simply the number of relatives one reports
having in the village, which should proxy for pressures to share with a wider
social network. Both variables enter the regression positively, consistent with
the pressure leading to less saving. Their magnitudes are precisely estimated
to be economically small; we can reject a null hypothesis of large positive
correlations with revisions toward sooner.
In column 6, we add to the set of regressors several characteristics of one’s
spouse choices and performance on tests in stage one (coefficients omitted for
brevity).41 There is no evidence that any of the results we have described so
far are simply be due to omitted spousal variables: their inclusion has little
effect on other coefficients of interest.
In sum, the patterns in Table 5 provide some support for a model of quasi-
used in extrapolating these results to other settings subject to greater risk.
39As with the present-bias ratio, we exclude the implemented choice from this calculation
to guard against a spurious positive relationship caused by random choice.
40Revisions towards the spousal allocation could happen unwillingly, as the result of pres-
sure from the spouse (Ashraf, 2009 and Schaner, 2015), or willingly, say on the basis of
information provided by the spouse as to optimal actions.
41These variables are: fraction present biased across all choices, word recall, Raven’s score,
financial literacy score, and fraction of decisions consistent with law of demand.
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hyperbolic discounting as an account of some respondents’ behaviour. Test
1 shows that individuals whose stage one allocations exhibit more “present”
-biased preference reversals – reversals that cannot easily be explained by
changes in the marginal utility of consumption – revise more towards sooner.
Test 2 shows that revisions toward sooner are also larger when individuals
make their revision at a time sufficiently close to the funds disbursement date.
We estimate quite precisely little effect of social pressure on the tendency
to revise. Finally we find no evidence that variables representing financial
sophistication or shocks have statistically significant or robust relationships
with revision behaviour. Thus, the results provide no support for the idea
that mistakes in initial allocations (which should be more prevalent for those
with lower financial sophistication) are important determinants of revision over
this horizon.
Examining the coefficients from column 6 of Table 5, we can assess their
economic magnitude. A useful benchmark for this purpose is the impact of a
50-percentage point reduction in the rate of return to waiting 30 days, which
leads to a 111.31 MK increase in revisions toward sooner. In comparison, a one-
standard-deviation (0.28) increase in the measure of present-bias is associated
with 60.36 MK higher revisions toward sooner, and making one’s revision
decision within six days of day t=61 raises revisions toward sooner by 124.63
MK.42
42In the Online Appendix, we provide the following additional analyses. First, we show in
Section 3.3 that the indicator we use for the targeted lag to first disbursement is a reasonable
approximation. Second, in Online Appendix section 3.4 we show that no pattern similar
to that shown by “present-bias” appears for an analogously-defined “future-bias” variable.
In results available upon request, we find that the coefficients on the measures of present-
and future-bias are not statistically different from each other when included in the same
regression, though the magnitude of the coefficient on the present-bias term remains almost
70 percent larger than that of the future-bias term. Third, in Online Appendix section
3.5 we provide an analysis of attrition related to the randomised target lag, showing that
while attrition is statistically significantly higher at lower target lags, the magnitude of
this relationship is small enough that it would be highly implausible for our results related
to the target lag to be driven purely by selection. Fourth, in Online Appendix section
3.6 we estimate the specification of column 6, Table 5 separately for males and female
respondents, and find no strong evidence of gender differences in key coefficients. Fifth, in
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4 Related Literature
There is a long tradition of evaluating time preferences from observational
choices over time. Hausman (1979), Lawrance (1991) and Warner and Pleeter
(2001) are prominent examples. In this tradition, the analyst observes the
(implicit) price consumers are willing to pay in order to move consumption
forward in time. In Hausman (1979), a time discount rate is inferred from the
price elasticity of demand for long-run energy efficiency in household appli-
ances. The early contributions to this literature assumed that time discount
rates were constant with respect to time. More recently, observational data
has been used to estimate potentially non-constant time-discount functions.
This literature, which restricts itself to estimating quasi-hyperbolic discount
functions, includes Paserman (2008), Fang and Silverman (2009) and Laib-
son et al. (2007). We depart from this literature by adopting experimental
methods for eliciting intertemporal choices and working with non-parametric
measures of patience and “present”-bias.
The experimental literature on time preference is large. Influential recent
examples include Halevy (2015), Augenblick et al. (2015), Andersen, et al.
(2008), Benhabib, et al. (2010), and Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). Frederick,
et al. (2002) provides a review. Our paper is distinguished from the bulk of
this literature by, among other things, our implementation of a lab-in-the-field
experiment with a large and heterogeneous sample. We can thus examine
the correspondence between subjects’ experimental behaviour and their “real
world” characteristics and behaviours.
Our paper thus joins the relatively recent trend to augment lab studies of
time preference with experiments in the field, such as Harrison, et al. (2005),
Online Appendix section 3.7, we replicate Table 5 excluding individuals that are inconsistent
in 3 or more pairs. One may think that these individuals do not understand the experiment
thus contributing to measurement error. We find that most of the results hold and that the
coefficients of interest are not larger in absolute value, suggesting that there is no attenuation
bias. Finally, using a flexible “δ−β” model we structurally estimate the individual discount
factor β and include it as a regressor in the specification of Table 5. Appendix Table 9
contains the results. Online Appendix section 3.8 contains the details.
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Ashraf, et al. (2006), and Tanaka et al. (2009). Two of these studies are
closely related to ours. The first, Ashraf, et al. (2006), fielded hypothetical
time preference questions among Philippine respondents who were then later
offered a commitment saving product. Women who exhibited present-biased
preference reversals on the survey questions were, as predicted by theory, more
likely to take up the commitment saving product. Our paper differs from
this study by studying directly the link between incentivised intertemporal
allocation decisions and revision of prior choices. We measure the extent of
preference reversals, as well as the basic consistency of choice with rational
economic models, and thus provide a quantitative assessment of the mecha-
nisms behind time inconsistency and the demand for commitment. The second
related paper, Harrison, et al. (2005), elicited time preferences among Dan-
ish respondents. A subset of respondents were later revisited and asked to
perform the same time preference experiment again. Our experiment differs
from Harrison, et al. (2005) by, among other things, making a participant’s
original choice clear and salient. Our goal is not to evaluate the stability of
time preference, but rather to measure revisions of intertemporal plans and to
shed light on the determinants of such revisions.
5 Conclusion
The consequences of sub-optimal intertemporal choices can be serious, es-
pecially among the poor in developing countries. We conducted an experiment
among Malawian farmers to investigate why their intertemporal choices may
appear not to serve their individual self-interest. More precisely, we provide
the first field evidence on the causes and correlates of decisions to revise prior
intertemporal choices made under commitment. The experiment allowed sub-
jects to make an intertemporal allocation of substantial funds they would re-
ceive at two future times 30 days apart. This future 30-day period was timed
to occur during a period of low income and low food stores, during which con-
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sumption smoothing of substantial amounts of future income is very difficult.
Several weeks later, prior to the first disbursal of funds, we revisited study par-
ticipants and allowed them to revise their previous allocations over the same
30-day period. We examine these revisions of allocations for evidence of self-
control problems as well as other potential mechanisms behind intertemporal
choice revision.
We provide a new evaluation of the importance of self-control problems
in a developing context. We test, in particular, whether revisions of alloca-
tions toward the present are positively associated with measures of ‘`present´’
-bias from an earlier baseline survey, or with the (randomly assigned) close-
ness in time to the first possible date of money disbursement.43 These tests
complement existing tests of self-control problems based on demand for com-
mitment devices. In contrast to analyses of demand for commitment devices,
our approach has the advantage of allowing even na¨ıve individuals (who are
not aware of their self-control problems) to contribute to estimates, since na¨ıve
as well as sophisticated respondents can display revision behaviour. In addi-
tion, analysis of revision behaviour avoids problems of low demand that may
arise if commitment devices are poorly designed.
We find that only a minority of our sample exhibits “present”-biased static
preference reversals that cannot be easily reconciled by predictable changes in
the marginal utility consumption. But the correlation between these reversals
and revision of prior choices toward sooner is relatively large. Consistent with
a model of self-control problems, the correlation between the time to the first
possible date of disbursement and revisions toward sooner is negative. We find
no evidence that respondents’ revisions tend to move in the direction of their
spouses’ preferences for such revision. Similarly, though with less precision, we
find no evidence that mistakes or shocks predict revisions of prior intertemporal
choices.
These results suggest cautious optimism about efforts to improve the lives
43This result is reminiscent of Kaur, Kremer, and Mullainathan’s (2015) finding that
worker effort increases as a worker’s randomly-assigned payday comes closer.
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of the very poor in developing countries via interventions that address their
problems of self-control. Our results support the view that, if we privilege an
individual’s preferences at moments relatively far from the present, there may
be important benefits of commitment for some people and the costs of such
commitments, in terms of reduced flexibility, would be limited.
This view should be tempered, however, by two important caveats. First,
our findings show that “present” -bias, as evidenced by static preference re-
versals, is far from ubiquitous in this population. Many of the participants
in the experiment exhibited, at most, just a modest tendency to be “present”
-biased. In addition, we provide evidence that some of the revisions towards
the sooner allocation, consistent with present-bias, are more likely to reflect
anticipated time-varying intertemporal elasticities of substitution, rather than
time-varying discount rates. Policy design must take account of this hetero-
geneity; efforts to help some with their legitimate self-control problems must
avoid saddling others with commitments they do not need. Second, and re-
lated, our experiment was conducted during the lean season when little income
is generated. This makes ours an unlikely context for finding that income fluc-
tuations influence revision. It is possible that income shortfalls may influence
revision behaviour in other parts of the Malawian agricultural year, such as in
the post-harvest months.
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0 1t = 31 46 61 91
Stage 1: 
Baseline interview 
and committed 
choices regarding  
t=1 vs. 31 and
t=61 vs. 91
First (“sooner”) 
possible disbursement 
of funds
Second (“later”) 
possible disbursement 
of funds
Stage 2: 
Revisit interview 
and (un)revised 
choices regarding
t=61 vs. 91
Third (“sooner”) 
possible disbursement 
of funds
Fourth (“later”) 
possible disbursement 
of funds
Figure 1: Timeline of Interviews, Choices, and Disbursement of Funds
“Near” period “Far” period
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev Min 10th pctile 50th pctile 90th pctile Max
Panel A: Baseline sample (stage 1)
Change in Allocation to Sooner, Avg. Across All Interest Rates (MK) 2142 15.70 302.66 -2000 -280 0 340 2000
Fraction Present Biased, All Interest Rates 2142 0.29 0.27 0 0 0.2 0.6 1
Fraction Present Biased, Non-Implemented Interest Rates 2142 0.28 0.28 0 0 0.25 0.75 1
Indicator: more elastic in the far time frame 2142 0.33 0.47 0 0 0 1 1
Fraction of Decisions Consistent with Law of Demand 2142 0.81 0.18 0.125 0.5 0.875 1 1
Fraction of All Tokens Allocated to "Sooner" 2142 0.37 0.19 0 0.1 0.389 0.578
Implemented Interest Rate 2142 0.62 0.33 0.1 0.1 0.75 1 1
Demographics
Male 2142 0.50 0.50 0 0 0 1 1
Respondent's Own Age 2142 46.47 14.02 18 28 46 65 95
Age 35 or under 2142 0.24 0.43 0 0 0 1 1
36-56 years old 2142 0.51 0.50 0 0 1 1 1
Respondent's Spouse's Age 2142 46.48 14.04 18 28 46 65 95
Years of Schooling 2142 4.47 4.20 0 0 4 8 77
Some Primary School 2142 0.61 0.49 0 0 1 1 1
Primary School 2142 0.15 0.36 0 0 0 1 1
More than Primary School 2142 0.07 0.26 0 0 0 0 1
Have Adequate Maize 2142 0.22 0.41 0 0 0 1 1
Number of Relatives in Village 2142 4.64 8.63 0 0 2 10 132
Total Number of People in Village 2142 177.08 258.47 0 35 120 320 4000
Aptitude Questions
Words Recalled - First Time 2142 4.81 1.31 0 3 5 6 10
Number Correct on Raven's Matrices 2142 1.53 0.92 0 0 2 3 3
Financial Literacy Questions Correct 2142 0.73 0.99 0 0 0 2 3
Wealth and Income
Total HH Wealth 2142 11449 27313 40 1020 4446 25800 695025
HH Total in Bank 2142 447.86 2358.96 0 0 0 700 54000
HH Total Cash 2142 156.26 1353.26 0 0 0 100 34000
HH Items 2142 6218 19737 0 600 2346 11625 588290
HH Animals 2142 4627 10776 0 0 1250 12150 123600
Expected Income (in period between baseline and revisit) 2142 1758 6307 0 0 50 4470 137700
Panel B: Revisit sample (stage 2)
Change in Sooner Allocation upon Revisiting (MK) 661 61.42 595.98 -2000 -600 0 900 2100
Indicator: Change in Sooner Allocation Upon Revisiting is Negative 661 0.31 0.46 0 0 0 1 1
Indicator: Change in Sooner Allocation Upon Revisiting is Positive 661 0.34 0.47 0 0 0 1 1
Fraction Present Biased, All Interest Rates 661 0.30 0.28 0 0 0.20 0.80 1
Fraction Present Biased, Non-Implemented Interest Rates 661 0.30 0.29 0 0 0.25 0.75 1
Indicator: more elastic in the far time frame 661 0.33 0.47 0 0 0 1 1
Fraction of Decisions Consistent with Law of Demand 661 0.81 0.17 0.25 0.63 0.88 1 1
Fraction of All Tokens Allocated to "Sooner" 661 0.36 0.18 0 0.11 0.38 0.57
Days to First Disbursement at Revisit (Targeted) 661 9.22 4.42 2 3 10 15 16
Days to First Disbursement at Revisit (Actual) 661 8.98 4.45 1 3 9 15 16
Indicator: Days to First Disbursement (Targeted) is 6 days or less 661 0.33 0.47 0 0 0 1 1
Implemented Interest Rate 661 0.58 0.32 0.1 0.1 0.75 1 1
Shocks
Death in Family 661 0.02 0.15 0 0 0 0 1
Shock to Expected HH Income 661 114.21 714.59 -2985 -90 0 350 13735
Spouse minus own allocation to sooner (MK) 661 712.25 488.89 0 0 700 1400 2000
Notes: Both baseline and revisit datasets are at individual level. Baseline dataset (Panel A) composed of wife-husband pairs interviewed separately in Jan-Feb 2010. Revisit dataset 
(Panel B) constructed by first randomly choosing 2/3 of households surveyed at baseline and then randomly choosing either husband or wife within household. Revisit interviews 
occurred in Mar-Apr 2010, with target revisit date randomly chosen to fall between 46 to 59 days after baseline interview (16 to 2 days prior to first "far" period disbursement at day 
61). 
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Number of Consistent Pairs (1) Real Data (2) Simulated Data
0 0.00% 0.00%
1 0.28% 0.04%
2 0.61% 1.56%
3 1.96% 12.08%
4 7.38% 33.92%
5 14.05% 35.49%
6 21.48% 14.77%
7 22.97% 2.05%
8 31.28% 0.09%
Table 3: Allocations to Later, in Malawi Kwacha, by Time Frame and Rate of Return
Percent at
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th a corner
Panel A:  Allocations to Later
  Near period
t+30 at r=10% 1295.9 524.8 660 1100 1320 1650 2090 13%
t+30 at r=25% 1535.8 602.1 750 1250 1500 1875 2500 14%
t+30 at r=50% 1930.5 734.0 1050 1500 1950 2550 3000 16%
t+30 at r=75% 2256.8 885.1 1050 1750 2275 2975 3500 17%
t+30 at r=100% 2713.7 1045.4 1200 2000 2800 3600 4000 22%
  Far period
t+90 at r=10% 1306.7 518.7 660 1100 1320 1650 2090 12%
t+90 at r=25% 1565.4 590.0 875 1250 1500 2000 2500 14%
t+90 at r=50% 1922.9 733.2 900 1500 1950 2400 3000 16%
t+90 at r=75% 2306.5 872.0 1225 1750 2275 2975 3500 18%
t+90 at r=100% 2757.1 1030.8 1400 2000 2800 3800 4000 23%
Panel B:  Allocations to Sooner
  Near period
t+30 at r=10% 821.8 477.2 100 500 800 1000 1400 10%
t+30 at r=25% 771.4 481.5 0 500 800 1000 1400 11%
t+30 at r=50% 712.9 489.3 0 300 700 1000 1300 14%
t+30 at r=75% 710.2 505.9 0 300 700 1000 1400 14%
t+30 at r=100% 643.0 522.6 0 200 600 1000 1400 20%
  Far period
t+90 at r=10% 812.3 471.7 100 500 800 1000 1400 9%
t+90 at r=25% 747.3 471.8 0 400 800 1000 1300 12%
t+90 at r=50% 718.1 488.8 0 400 700 1000 1400 14%
t+90 at r=75% 681.8 498.3 0 300 700 1000 1300 16%
t+90 at r=100% 621.4 515.4 0 100 600 1000 1300 21%
Table 2: Number (of 8) Positive Changes in Later Allocation with Increase in r
Notes: Table presents share of individuals whose allocations in 8 pairs of choices (with adjacent interest 
rates) are consistent with law of demand.  Data in column (1) are from baseline sample (for details, see 
Table 1).  Data from column (2) are from random-choice simulations described in Online Appendix 
section 4.
Mean Std. Dev
Percentiles
Notes: Data are from baseline sample (for details, see Table 1). Table presents allocations to "later" date (either t=30 or t=90) for 
each of 10 choices presented to respondents. Baseline interview is at t=0. First set of 5 choices is in "near" period, when 
allocations are between t=1 and t=31. 2nd set of 5 choices is in "far" period, when allocations are between t=61 and t=91. Rates 
of return to waiting until "later" date (interest rates) take on values of 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%. Allocations between 
sooner and later date must be made in 100MK increments, out of total budget of 2000MK.
This	article	is	protected	by	copyright.	All	rights	reserved
Au
th
or
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
Table 4: Determinants of Fraction Consistent or Fraction Present-biased
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male      0.029*       0.024*       0.001        0.003   
   (0.015)      (0.014)      (0.013)      (0.013)   
Age 35 or under     -0.029       -0.013        0.017        0.011   
   (0.021)      (0.019)      (0.018)      (0.018)   
36-56 yrs old     -0.021       -0.020        0.009        0.008   
   (0.017)      (0.015)      (0.015)      (0.014)   
Some primary school     -0.032*      -0.030*       0.031*       0.030*  
   (0.019)      (0.016)      (0.016)      (0.016)   
Primary school     -0.036       -0.021        0.017        0.011   
   (0.027)      (0.023)      (0.023)      (0.022)   
More than primary school     -0.068**     -0.070**      0.046        0.046   
   (0.034)      (0.030)      (0.031)      (0.030)   
Have adequate maize      0.032*       0.022       -0.007       -0.003   
   (0.018)      (0.016)      (0.015)      (0.015)   
Baseline wealth (100s of MK)     -0.000       -0.000       -0.000       -0.000   
   (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)   
Words recalled      0.004        0.001        0.002        0.003   
   (0.006)      (0.005)      (0.005)      (0.005)   
Raven's Tests Correct     -0.001        0.006       -0.006       -0.009   
   (0.008)      (0.007)      (0.007)      (0.007)   
Financial Literacy Questions Correct      0.008       -0.001       -0.004       -0.001   
   (0.009)      (0.008)      (0.007)      (0.007)   
Number of relatives in the village      0.001        0.000        0.001        0.001   
   (0.001)      (0.001)      (0.001)      (0.001)   
Adherence to law of demand ratio [0,1]      0.695***     -0.255***
   (0.038)      (0.034)   
Indicator:  more elastic in the far time frame     -0.100***      0.044***
   (0.012)      (0.012)   
Constant      0.456***     -0.069*       0.252***      0.442***
   (0.032)      (0.041)      (0.028)      (0.040)   
N       2142         2142         2142         2142   
Adjusted R-squared       0.00         0.20        -0.00         0.04   
P-value that all HH characteristics = 0 0.09 0.18 0.75 0.69
Dependent variable:
Fraction consistent Fraction present-biased
Note: Dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the fraction of the five choices pairs that were 
dynamically consistent.  Dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is the fraction of choice pairs that 
exhibited present bias. Unit of observation is individuals included in the baseline sample. All 
allocations made in Jan-Feb 2010.
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Table 5: Determinants of revisions toward sooner
Ordinary least-squares regressions
Dependent variable: Change in sooner allocation upon revisiting (MK)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Preferences under commitment
Fraction Present Biased, Non-Implemented Interest Rates    196.385**    195.808**    196.736**    198.033**    214.286** 
  (95.222)     (95.110)     (95.457)     (97.578)     (95.871)   
Fraction of all tokens allocated to "sooner"   -523.457***   -512.533**   -495.282**   -472.658**   -468.704** 
 (144.727)    (183.875)    (185.305)    (208.907)    (228.647)   
Indicator: days to first disbursement (targeted) <=6    107.737**    111.270**    113.743**    113.971**    124.629** 
  (50.162)     (50.508)     (50.763)     (50.890)     (51.040)   
Indicator: more elastic in the far time frame    127.723*     131.860*     138.471*     137.956*     136.351*  
  (76.722)     (77.815)     (77.303)     (77.797)     (78.877)   
Fraction Present Biased   -200.517     -204.079     -206.583     -207.747     -216.585   
   * Indicator: more elastic in the far time frame  (175.339)    (177.404)    (178.197)    (180.001)    (180.320)   
Financial sophistication
Fraction of Decisions Consistent with Law of Demand      0.813       21.584       20.991        6.693   
 (177.867)    (178.276)    (178.423)    (178.688)   
Words recalled     -1.384       -0.818       -0.737        0.437   
  (19.274)     (19.169)     (19.287)     (19.275)   
Raven's Tests Correct    -29.722      -30.415      -30.295      -22.245   
  (28.502)     (28.697)     (28.608)     (29.117)   
Financial Literacy Questions Correct     16.379       14.878       14.671       25.197   
  (28.644)     (28.452)     (28.672)     (28.771)   
Shocks
Death in the family (indic.)     62.129       63.379       55.954   
 (203.497)    (203.721)    (202.864)   
Shortfall in expected hh income (MK)      0.053        0.052        0.049   
   (0.041)      (0.041)      (0.038)   
Social pressure
Spouse minus own allocation to sooner (MK)      0.013        0.044   
   (0.064)      (0.081)   
Number of relatives in the village      0.830        1.589   
   (3.489)      (3.382)   
Rate of return to waiting
Implemented interest rate {.1,.25,.5,.75,1}   -143.004*    -230.279**   -227.048**   -217.948**   -216.638**   -222.626** 
  (78.279)     (81.576)     (81.585)     (81.543)     (82.219)     (82.654)   
Baseline characteristics
Male    125.169**    102.197**    103.061**    105.891**    101.623*      57.796   
  (49.851)     (49.639)     (51.948)     (51.810)     (53.367)     (61.461)   
Age 35 or under    198.798**    183.041**    179.567**    177.550**    177.044**    283.013** 
  (71.742)     (70.736)     (70.943)     (71.396)     (71.965)    (109.969)   
36-56 yrs old    117.670**    107.302**    110.236**    113.512**    112.177**    178.055** 
  (54.887)     (54.200)     (53.493)     (53.665)     (55.422)     (64.326)   
Some primary school    -66.952      -81.393      -76.593      -74.929      -75.660      -32.505   
  (70.212)     (68.760)     (72.070)     (70.397)     (70.858)     (72.125)   
Primary school   -159.166*    -164.017*    -160.505*    -169.354*    -170.945*    -126.996   
  (85.954)     (84.113)     (90.934)     (90.073)     (90.245)     (92.344)   
More than primary school   -215.094**   -230.233**   -218.818*    -222.391*    -222.868*    -148.056   
 (105.964)    (105.190)    (118.268)    (116.837)    (116.832)    (119.628)   
Have adequate maize     35.744       21.233       25.514       22.494       20.949        3.560   
  (56.325)     (55.263)     (56.060)     (56.891)     (57.838)     (57.848)   
Total HH Wealth     -0.122       -0.125       -0.125       -0.130       -0.128       -0.124   
   (0.089)      (0.086)      (0.085)      (0.084)      (0.085)      (0.088)   
Controls for:
Spousal characteristics - - - - - Y
R-squared (adj.)       0.02         0.05         0.04         0.05         0.04         0.05   
N        661          661          661          661          661          661   
P-val of F-test: Frac PB + 1(Δεf) + Frac PB x 1(Δİf) = 0 0.29 0.30 0.38 0.29 0.26
P-value of F-test: financial sophistication variables jointly 0       0.84         0.84         0.84         0.86   
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: Unit of observation is individual included in revisit sample. Spousal characteristics controls are: fraction present biased for all choices, 
indicators for age category, indicators for education category, word recall, ravens score, financial literacy score, and fraction of choices adhering to 
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FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
Appendix for “Revising Commitments: Field
Evidence on the Adjustment of Prior Choices”
February 24, 2016
1 The experiment: subject pool
Participants in our study were farmers under contract with (the subsidiaries
of) two large tobacco companies in the 2008-2009 growing season. The compa-
nies organised the farmers into clubs that range in size from 3 to 43 members.
To facilitate timely revisiting, we limited our sample to those farmers located
near a main trading centre in the town of Mponela (population 13,670), and
who lived in six traditional authorities (TAs) in the Dowa and Ntchisi districts.
To allow relatively easy access to participants and to facilitate their access to
the cash disbursements, we included all farmers in these TAs that were 2008-
09 members of clubs in which the median club member lives 25 kilometres or
less from the disbursement office, located in Mponela. According to a survey
conducted between July and September of 2010 for the savings experiment,
participants in this study travelled to the a bank branch in Mponela about
once every three months, spending an average of 346.67 MK (US $2.31) per
round trip. About 35 percent of these trips combined the visit to the bank
with other errands, but there could be other trips to Mponela that did not
involve a visit to the bank branch.
1
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Scheduling for the stage one visit was stratified across agricultural zones.
Within a zone, the order in which clubs were visited was randomly assigned.
Scheduling was on a club-by-club basis in order to facilitate field work since
members of the same club often live within the same village or in neighbouring
villages.
2 Variable definitions
The key dependent variable we analyse is change in sooner allocation upon
revisiting (MK), which is the respondent’s allocation to later period (t=91)
in the revisit survey minus his/her allocation to later period (t=91) in the
baseline survey. All other variables are from either the baseline survey, the
revisit survey, or from administrative (project) data.
2.1 Variables collected in baseline survey
Present-biased ratio is fraction of pairs of choices in which a respondent
faced the same interest rate but the allocation to sooner in near time frame is
more than 100MK larger than the allocation to sooner in far time frame. In
all regressions this variable excludes the implemented interest rate from the
calculation, but summary statistics are also provided for all choices including
the implemented interest rate.
Future-biased ratio is fraction of choices where the allocation to sooner in
the near time frame is more than 100MK lower than allocation to sooner in far
time frame (again comparing choices in near and far frames for same interest
rate). In regressions this variable excludes the implemented interest rate from
the calculation.
Fraction sooner is the total number of tokens allocated to sooner in any
of the choices, divided by the total number of tokens to be allocated (20 in
each of the ten choices). In regressions, this variable excludes the choice at
the implemented interest rate in the calculation.
2
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Fraction of decisions consistent with law of demand is the fraction (out of
8) of pairs of choices adjacent in interest rates where allocation to later rises
in rate of return.
More elastic in the far time frame is an indicator for whether a respondent’s
choices are consistent with a greater responsiveness to the interest rate in the
far, relative to the near time frame. For each respondent, we first calculate four
values of the change in the share of consumption allocated to later associated
with each of the four incremental increases in the interest rate. We then take
the average of these four changes in the consumption share within time frame
and use this as a measure of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution within
time frame. We then create an indicator that takes on the value 1 when that
elasticity is (at least 0.1) larger in the far time frame than in the near and 0
otherwise.
More elastic in the near time frame is an indicator defined as above, except
that it takes the value 1 when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is
(at least 0.1) larger in the near time frame than the far time frame, and 0
otherwise.
Spouse minus own allocation to sooner (MK) is spousal allocation to the
sooner period minus corresponding allocation for respondent, for all choices
excluding the randomly-chosen implemented choice.
Implemented interest rate is rate of return to waiting 30 days for funds for
the respondent’s randomly-selected choice (out of 10 choices made).
HH total in bank is total value of balances in formal banks reported at
baseline (in thousands of MK).
HH total cash is total value of cash held at home reported at baseline (in
thousands of MK).
HH items is total value of physical household items and assets owned,
reported at baseline (in thousands of MK).
HH animals is total value of livestock owned, reported at baseline (in thou-
sands of MK).
Total HH wealth is sum of HH total in bank, HH total cash, HH items,
3
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and HH animals (in thousands of MK).
2.2 Variables collected in revisit survey
Indicator for death in family takes on the value 1 if a death is registered
in respondent’s own household from the baseline survey to the revisit survey.
Shortfall in expected household income is expected household income minus
actual household income, where expectation is reported in baseline and actual
is reported in revisit survey. Expected income is measured at baseline and
refers to April 1, 2010 and actual income is measured at revisit and refers to
income since the beginning of February 2010. Thus, the reference periods for
the two questions cover approximately the same time frame.
2.3 Variables from administrative (project) data
Days to first disbursement at revisit (targeted) is the randomised number of
days prior to the first far time frame disbursement date at which the revisit was
targeted to arrive. Randomization assigns days from 2 to 16 in unit intervals
with equal probability.
Days to first disbursement at revisit (actual) is actual number of days prior
to first far time frame disbursement that revisit survey is carried out.
Indicator for days to first disbursement (targeted) <= 6 equal to 1 if days
to first disbursement at revisit (targeted) is less than or equal to 6, and 0
otherwise.
3 Supplementary analyses
3.1 Baseline balance
The two randomizations carried out in stage one – the implemented choice,
and the revisit date – generated exogenous variation the interest rate that
applied to the revision decision and in the targeted revisit date itself. We
4
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provide here an analysis of balance of baseline respondent characteristics vis-
a-vis these two exogenously determined variables.
Appendix Table 1 presents results of regressions of several baseline variables
on an indicator for targeted days to first disbursement being less than or
equal to six (Panel A) and on the implemented interest rate (Panel B). (The
specification of the target lag as an indicator is chosen to be consistent with
the specification in the main regressions of Table 5, and is discussed further
below.) In the top panel, the coefficient on the randomised right-hand-side
variable is not statistically significantly different from zero for 11 out of the 14
dependent variables, and in the bottom panel it is not significant for 10 out of
14 dependent variables. Having four out of 14 coefficients turn up significant
is close to what would have occurred by chance, and all these variables (and
others) will be included as controls in the regression analyses below. Results
are similar when these regressions are run with alternative specifications for the
randomised right-hand-side variables, such as linear days to first disbursement
or dummies for each discrete implemented interest rate.
3.2 Determinants of allocations to later in stage one
We present here analysis of the determinants of the stage one allocations.
As highlighted in the discussion of Table 3 in the main text, these alloca-
tions exhibit substantial heterogeneity. Appendix Table 2 shows the results
of a regression of the difference between the natural log of the allocation to
sooner and later on the rate of return and observable characteristics of the
participants. Columns 1 and 2 use the sample for the near frame “1 vs. 31
days”, columns 3 and 4 use the sample for the far frame “ 61 vs 91 days”
while column 5 pools both samples. Conditional on the rate of return, those
with more wealth at baseline allocate more to later, as do those with more
relatives who live in the village although the changes in consumption implied
by a change in the number of relatives are small. There is also weak evidence
that those who scored higher on the word recall test and the financial literacy
5
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questions allocate more of their endowment to later, but that those who score
higher on the Raven’s test allocate less of their endowment to later. Measured
in this way, we find no evidence that education has a significant relationship
with patience in this domain. The last row of the regressions report the p-
value associated to an F-test that all household characteristics (excluding the
interest rate) are jointly different from zero. The p-value in column 5 (pooled
sample)is 0.01. We note however that given the large number of regressors
and the few coefficients with conventional statistical significance, these results
are only suggestive.
The estimates in the table have the advantage of being easily interpreted
in terms of a simple economic model of intertemporal choice. If we adopt the
model in Section 2.1.1 of the main text and assume time-invariant, isoelastic
utilities (u (c) = c
1−ρ
1−ρ
), then the coefficient on r is an estimate of 1
ρ
. The es-
timates in the table have the advantage of being easily interpreted in terms
of a simple economic model of intertemporal choice. The disadvantage of this
specification is that it excludes corner allocations, where the log of consump-
tion at one time or the other is undefined. Analysis of a levels specification
gives qualitatively similar results (available upon request) with more evidence
of a positive correlation between word recall and the willingness to postpone
consumption.
3.3 Alternate specifications of target lag
In all regressions of Table 5, the variable for targeted days to first disburse-
ment upon revisiting is specified as an indicator variable for six days or less.
Here we elaborate on the justification for this specification.1
First, we note that specifying the variable as a linear relationship leads to
1All specifications use the targeted lag between the revisit and disbursement because
the actual lag is endogenous. Eighty five percent of those in the revisit sample are visited
on exactly the targeted date. For the remainder, 84 percent are revisited within two days
of the target date and the maximum gap between the targeted and actual revisit date is
six days. The correlation between the delay in revisits and the assigned revisit date is not
statistically different from zero.
6
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a similar result. If we replace the indicator target lag variable with a linear
variable for targeted days to first disbursement in the specification of Table 5,
column 6, the coefficient on the linear target lag variable is -9.21 and has a
standard error of 5.33 (significant at the 10% level).2
It turns out, however, that the linear relationship just described masks the
fact that the underlying relationship between the target lag and revisions is
better described as a non-linear function. To see this, we again estimate the
specification of Table 5, column 6, but now we specify the target lag as separate
indicator variables for each of the 14 distinct values of the target lag from two
to 15 days prior to first disbursement (the omitted indicator is 16 days). In
Appendix Figure 4 we graphically present the estimated coefficients on the
target lag indicators. The solid line graphs the series of point estimates, and
the upper and lower dashed lines bound the upper and lower 95% confidence
intervals.
Point estimates on the indicators for days two through six are all large
in magnitude, each exceeding 100 MK, and show no obvious time pattern.
In contrast, nearly all the coefficients on the indicators for higher target lags
are substantially smaller in magnitude and several are below or just at zero.
(The exception is the coefficient on the indicator for 11 days, 141 MK. This is
probably a chance occurrence, and the coefficient is not statistically different
from zero at standard confidence levels.) Due to lack of power, most of the
individual coefficients are not statistically significantly different from zero at
conventional levels (although the coefficients on the indicators for days four
and six are statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level).
All told, the relationship appears to be best summarised by a step function
with a positive effect for days two to six prior to disbursement, and zero effect
thereafter.
2All other coefficients in the regression remain essentially identical.
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3.4 Future bias vs. “present” bias
The analysis in the main text focuses on the predictions of quasi-hyperbolic
discounting models with β ≤ 1. This is natural given the laboratory evidence
and well-developed theory surrounding them and other models of present-bias.
Future bias is, however, also possible. Models of future bias would imply that
respondents would shift allocations toward later as the intertemporal tradeoffs
draw near. Appendix Table 4 considers this possibility, first replacing the frac-
tion present biased variable with a future biased variable defined analogously
in column 1 and in column 2 by including the variable “Fraction Future bi-
ased” to the specification in column 6, Table 5. Both regressions also include
an indicator for “more elastic in the near time frame” and an interaction term
between this indicator and fraction future biased. The rest of the variables are
identical to those of Table 5, column 6.
Contrary to a theory that attributes future-biased static preference rever-
sals to non-constant time discounting, the coefficient on the main effect of frac-
tion future-biased choices is actually positive in both columns. The coefficient
is not precisely estimated, however, and we cannot reject a null hypothesis of
no effect, or even a moderate-sized negative effect, at conventional levels of sig-
nificance. Summing the coefficients on this main effect with its interaction with
“more elastic in the near horizon” we again find that those who exhibit static
preference reversals that can be easily reconciled with time-specific marginal
utilities of consumption exhibit no time inconsistency on average. Unlike the
results from Table 5 investigating “present”-bias, however, our inference is
limited by the imprecision of the point estimates. One interpretation of these
findings is that the future-biased static preference reversals capture predictable
changes in the marginal utility of income, more than some form of non-constant
discounting. More generally, the future-biased preference reversals appear to
be driven by mechanisms that do not induce time-inconsistency.
8
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3.5 Attrition
We attempted to revisit 722 individuals with complete baseline data. We
were successful at revisiting 661 (91.6%). This high revisit success rate helps
ameliorate concerns over selection bias, but it is still important to ascertain
the extent to which key right-hand-side variables are related with attrition,
and to think through any resulting directions of bias.
Appendix Table 5 presents regressions of an indicator for inclusion in the
sample on key right-hand-side variables. The sample is the 722 individuals
we attempted to revisit, so the mean of the dependent variable is the revisit
success rate, 0.916. Individuals targeted for revisit six days or less prior to first
disbursement are 10.8 percentage points less likely to be included in the revisit
sample. This reflects the simple fact that our survey team had less time to find
individuals whose target revisit date was close to the disbursement date.3,4
An important question is whether the key results (in Table 5) on the impact
of days to first disbursement on revisions could be driven entirely by selection,
since the variable is statistically significantly related to revisit success. Given
the sizes of the effects in Table 5, this turns out to be implausible.
Consider the coefficient in column 6, Table 5 on the indicator for targeted
days to first disbursement less than or equal to six, 124.629. This variable
leads to 10.8 percentage points lower inclusion in the sample. For differential
selection on this variable to fully explain the coefficient in column 6, Table
5, revision towards sooner of individuals selecting out of the sample due to
having days to first disbursement less than or equal to six would have to
have been lower by 1,118.20 MK.5 A change in revisions of this magnitude
3The closest randomised target date was two days prior to first disbursement, and the
cutoff date for actual revisits was set at 1 day prior to first disbursement. Revisits on or
after that date would be nonsensical, since the ”sooner” disbursement could already have
been made (if the respondent redeemed the voucher immediately on the disbursement date).
4In addition, individuals with higher word recall are less likely to be included in the
sample. Two additional words recalled (about one and a half standard deviations) leads
to a 3 percentage point lower likelihood of revisit success. Revisit success was higher for
individuals who are younger and who had lower baseline wealth.
5Let there be two types of individuals: type 1, who we always successfully revisit, and
9
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would be extremely large, amounting to roughly the difference between the
10th percentile (-600 MK) to the 83rd percentile (500 MK) of the revision
distribution, or about two standard deviations. It is highly unlikely that all the
individuals selecting out of the sample would have had revisions this different
from other individuals who were successfully revisited.
While it is very unlikely that the estimate of the impact of days to disburse-
ment from column 6, Table 5 is due entirely to selection, selection may still lead
to bias in this estimate. In Appendix Table 6 we present results of an exercise
intended to bound the size of this possible bias, running regressions analogous
to that of column 6, Table 5 but where observations that were previously not
included due to attrition are now included, and where we make several different
assumptions as to the value of the dependent variable for the newly-included
observations.6 At the top of each column is our assumption regarding revision
on the part of attrited observations. Across columns 1 through 7, we assume
initial allocations to sooner are revised in the amounts (respectively) of 600,
400, 200, 0, -200, -400, and -600.7 Looking across columns, the stability of co-
efficient estimates on particular independent variables provides a sense of the
type 2, who are only successfully revisited if days to first disbursement is >6. So when days
to first disbursement is greater than six, the sample is composed of both types 1 and 2,
while otherwise it is only composed of type 1. Let µ1 and µ2 be mean revision for type 1
and 2 individuals, respectively. We observe µ1, and the problem is to estimate the value
of µ2 such that there is actually no “effect” of days to first disbursement <=6, and all the
observed effect in Table 6 is due to selection. The formula for µ2 is µ2 =
(α+γ)(µ1−β)−αµ1
γ
,
where β is the coefficient on days to first disbursement less than or equal to six in the table
(124.629), α is the revisit success rate for type 1 individuals (0.861), γ is the reduction in
the revisit success rate due to revisiting 6 or fewer days to first disbursement (0.108), and
µ1 is the mean revision for type 1 individuals (mean revision for those with days to first
disbursement ¡=6, 150.0). The formula gives µ2 = -968.20. So µ1 − µ2 = 150.0 - (-968.20)
= 1,118.20.
6The only other difference vis-a-vis the regression in column 6, Table 5 is that we exclude
the shock variables “death in family” and “shortfall in expected household income” from
the right-hand-side of the regression, since these were also measured upon revisit.
7We of course do not allow revisions to go beyond corners, imposing the restriction that
revised allocations to sooner must stay within the [0,2000] range. For example, in column 1,
where we are assuming that revised allocations are 600 MK higher than attrited individuals’
initial allocations, if an individual initially allocated 1700 MK to sooner, we only allow the
revised allocation to sooner to go to 2000 MK (not 2300 MK).
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sensitivity of coefficients to a range of assumptions on how attrited individuals
would have revised their allocations.
When assuming positive revisions toward sooner for the attrited observa-
tions, the coefficient on the indicator for days to first disbursement less than or
equal to six becomes larger in magnitude, reflecting the fact that this variable
is positively correlated with attrition. For the same reason, assuming nega-
tive revisions toward sooner for attrited observations leads the coefficient on
this variable to become smaller in magnitude. The results indicate that the
coefficient on the indicator for days to first disbursement less than or equal to
six in Table 5 is robust to a wide range of assumptions on attriter revisions,
except when attriter revision is assumed to be as much as -600: in this case the
coefficient declines enough in magnitude to become statistically insignificant.
We view an assumption that attriters revise as much as -600 MK vis-a-vis
their initial allocations as farfetched; this change amounts to more than one
standard deviation of the revision distribution.
3.6 Males vs. females
In Appendix Table 7 we explore whether estimated effects differ across
males and females in the sample, estimating regressions analogous to column
6, Table 5, but where the sample is restricted to females (column 1) and
males (column 2). We also present p-values of the F-test that coefficients
on each presented right-hand-side variable differ across the female and male
regressions.
Owing to smaller sample sizes, the standard errors on the key point esti-
mates are relatively large. As a result, while we can sometimes reject a null
hypothesis of no relationship (e.g., on the days to first disbursement indicator
variable for male), mostly the coefficients cannot be distinguished statistically
from zero.
In addition, for nearly all variables, coefficients are not statistically signif-
icantly different across the male and female samples, with a few exceptions.
11
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The coefficient on the Raven’s test score is negative and statistically signif-
icantly different from zero among males, and is significantly different from
the corresponding (positive) coefficient among females. In the female sample,
coefficients on the schooling indicators are negative (indicating that higher
schooling leads to less revision towards sooner), statistically significantly dif-
ferent from zero, and statistically significantly different from the correspond-
ing coefficients in the male regression (or nearly so). The male coefficients on
schooling, on the other hand, are positive, but none are statistically signifi-
cantly different from zero. Finally, the coefficient on the death in the family
indicator is large and positive for females, smaller in magnitude and negative
for males, and marginally statistically significantly different across the male
and female regressions at the 10% level.
3.7 Consistent vs Inconsistent individuals
In Appendix Table 8 we explore whether the sample contains individuals
that did not understand the experiment. We replicate Table 5 excluding those
individuals that are inconsistent in 3 or more pairs in Table 2. If these indi-
viduals did not understand the experiment, there would be measurement error
and the estimates in Table 5 would suffer from attenuation bias.
We find that most of the results hold, but the coefficients of interest are
not larger in absolute value, suggesting that there is no attenuation bias and
that the results are not driven by people who simply did not understand the
experiment.
3.8 Structural estimates of β
In this subsection we describe the structural estimation of the discount
factors that are included as regressors in column 6 of Table 5. We follow the
theoretical framework of Section 2 and posit a flexible “δ − β” model that
allows the curvature parameter of the utility function to differ by time frame,
as in the example of Section 2. Therefore u1(c) = u2(c) and u3(c) = u4(c). We
12
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assume that the utility function is either CRRA or CARA and we estimate the
discount factors and curvature parameters from the experimental choice data
using Non Linear Least Squares, taking into account corner choices. Given the
concerns raised in Section 3.7, we perform the estimation using either the full
sample or the sub-sample of those who appear consistent.
Because the structural estimation allows to simultaneously estimate the
discount factors and curvature parameters, while taking into account corner
choices, we run several specifications of Table 5 that do not include “Fraction
present-biased”, “Fraction of all tokens to sooner” nor the indicator of “More
elastic in the far time frame”.
A natural hypothesis suggests that the more present-biased the individual
is, as indicated by a lower estimated β, the larger the revision towards sooner
will be upon revisit. Put differently, the coefficient on the discount factor β
should be negative and significant. The results reported in Appendix Table 9
suggest that the estimates all have the correct sign but are small in economic
magnitude and tend to be imprecisely estimated.
These estimates are interesting because they underscore the advantages and
disadvantages of this structural approach. The advantage, already mentioned,
is that neither the proxies for preference reversals, corner choices and non-
stationary utility functions nor their interactions are included in the reduced
form analysis. The approach has the disadvantage of relying on functional
form assumptions, and if these fit the data poorly the estimated discount
factor may not have predictive power.
4 Simulations of stochastic choice
In this section we assess the adherence of subjects’ optimizing behaviour
to the canonical model of Section 2.1.1 by comparing their choices to those
of hypothetical subjects that choose randomly. Given that more than two
thirds of individuals choose allocations that deviate at least once from the law
13
This	article	is	protected	by	copyright.	All	rights	reserved
Au
th
or
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
of demand, and that more than 90% make at least one different allocation
in the “near” compared to the “far” time frame, random choice is a useful
benchmark.8
The interest in random choice model is twofold. First, it can be used
to alleviate concerns about the low levels of literacy of the subject pool. In
particular, we assess whether our results can be generated by individuals that
do not understand the experimental protocols and that in the extreme, choose
randomly. Second, as we explain in more detail below, we use the results from
the random choice model to justify how we deal with implementation error in
the analysis of Table 5.
We generate 1,000 random samples of 661 subjects who choose allocations
randomly. That is, each possible allocation ([2000,0], [1900, 100(1+r)], . . .
[0, 2000(1+r)]) is chosen with probability 1/21. To construct spousal controls,
individuals are matched with their real life spouses and their (random) choices
are used to generate the relevant variables. For each sample of random choices
we run the specifications of column 6 of Table 5 and of Appendix Table 4 and
for each coefficient in the regression, we report its mean and construct the 95%
confidence interval non-parametrically using the 25th and 975th coefficient.
Appendix Table 9 reports the results. We compare coefficients obtained
using real data (odd numbered columns) to simulated or random choice data
(even numbered columns). Columns 1 and 2 compute the “Fraction Present
Biased” variable using all pairs, including the one associated with the imple-
mented interest rate. The variable “Spouse minus own allocation to sooner”
is also computed using all interest rate pairs. Columns 3 and 4, in contrast,
exclude the pair of the implemented interest rate in both variables. All regres-
sions include all other right hand side variables in the respective comparison
8Other models based on changes in expected income between the “near” and “far” time
frame would only be consistent with individuals being either always or never dynamically
consistent. If an individual expects a windfall between the near and far time frame, he or
she would appear more patient in the far time frame under all interest rates. These models
cannot explain why some individuals are dynamically consistent under some interest rates
but not others.
14
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regressions (column 6 of Table 5 and the single regression in Appendix Table
4). They are not reported since by definition they are uncorrelated with the
random choices.
Comparing the results in columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table 10 we see
that when all pairs are included, the coefficient on “Fraction Present Biased”
using simulated data is more than twice as large than the coefficient when
using the real experimental data. Both coefficients are large and significant
at conventional levels, suggesting that a null that the coefficient is zero is
insufficiently discerning.
As mentioned in the text, the reason for the large coefficient using simulated
data is a mechanical relationship between “present” bias - like behaviour under
the implemented interest rate and revisions to the sooner period. Intuitively,
in the second stage of the experiment, an individual who exhibits “present”
bias will, by definition, have chosen in the far time frame an allocation to
sooner that is lower than that of the near time frame. Thus, even under
random choice, the probability that the revised allocation to sooner is larger
than the (below average) original allocation is relatively high – hence the
mechanical positive relationship between revision to sooner and “present” bias.
An analogous argument explains the mechanical negative relationship between
revisions to sooner and “future” bias.
If implementation error is independent across choices, however, there should
be no relationship between random choices under interest rates other than the
implemented one and revision behaviour under the implemented interest rate.
This therefore suggests the construction of the variables “Fraction Present
Biased” and “Spouse minus own allocation to sooner” excluding the choices
under the implemented interest rate.
Indeed, the coefficient on “Fraction Present Bias” in column 4 is small in
magnitude and statistically insignificant (albeit with a rather large confidence
interval). This small coefficient stands in contrast with that of column 3,
replicating column 6 of Table 5.
Under random choice, individuals that appear more elastic in the far time
15
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frame do not necessarily revise allocations towards sooner. The point esti-
mates in columns 2 and 4 of the indicator “more elastic in the far time frame”
are small and the confidence interval large suggesting that they are not signifi-
cantly different from zero. The interaction between the indicator and “Fraction
Present Biased” is also small and insignificant and a test that the sum of co-
efficients is different from zero yield again confidence intervals that include
zero. In this sense, the simulation cannot generate the result found with real
data that the link between present bias and static preference reversals is only
found among individuals with stable marginal utility of consumption across
time frames.
Columns 5 to 8 study the relationship between future bias and revision be-
haviour. As expected, column 6 displays the mechanical negative relationship
between “Fraction Future Biased,” computed using all interest rates and the
change in the allocation to sooner. However, this relationship disappears in
column 8 when the choices under the implemented interest rate are excluded.
As in Appendix Table 4, “future” biasedness and differences in marginal util-
ities across time frames cannot explain revision behaviour.
16
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Appendix Figure 1: Schematic of the Preference Elicitation Method; Example with r=0.25 
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Appendix Figure 2: Schematic of the Revising Procedure; Example with r=0.25 
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Notes: Initial allocations made in Jan-Feb 2010. Revisions made in Mar-Apr 2010 in a revisit targeted at a randomized 2-16 days prior to date of first 
disbursement in "far" period. (Date of first disbursement in far period is day t=61 from initial visit in Jan-Feb 2010.) N=664.
Appendix Figure 3: Distribution of Change in Sooner Allocation Upon Revisiting
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Appendix Figure 4: Impact of targeted days before disbursement on revisions toward sooner
Notes: Figure plots coefficient (and 95% confidence interval) on indicator variables for each separate value of days to first disbursement (omitted category 
is 16 days to first disbursement). Dependent variable is change in allocation to sooner upon revisiting (in MK). Other right-hand-side variables are as 
in Table 6, column 6.
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Appendix Table 1: Tests of baseline balance with respect to randomized independent variables
Ordinary least-squares regressions
Dependent variable: Fraction 
Present 
Biased, Non-
Implemented 
Interest Rates
Fraction of all 
tokens 
allocated to 
"sooner"
Indicator: 
more elastic 
in the far time 
frame
Fraction of 
Decisions 
Consistent 
with Law of 
Demand
Words 
Recalled
Raven's Tests 
Correct
Financial 
Literacy 
Questions 
Correct
Spouse minus 
own 
allocation to 
sooner (MK)
Number of 
Relatives in 
the Village
Male Age Years of 
Education
Have 
Adequate 
Maize
Total HH 
Wealth
Panel A
Indicator: days to first disbursement -0.008 -0.035** 0.001 -0.009 0.026 0.062 -0.074 80.415* -0.381 0.067 -0.030 -0.144 0.002 -58.843***
     (targeted) <=6 (0.022) (0.016) (0.039) (0.015) (0.117) (0.074) (0.080) (41.852) (0.573) (0.041) (1.145) (0.263) (0.036) (13.074)
R-squared 0.0002 0.0078 0.0000 0.0007 0.0001 0.0010 0.0013 0.0057 0.0006 0.0039 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0169
N 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661
Panel B
Implemented interest rate {.1,.25,.5,.75,1} -0.033 -0.120*** 0.016 0.034* 0.448*** 0.075 0.012 129.492** -1.205 -0.083 -0.996 0.558 -0.058 12.668
(0.033) (0.021) (0.057) (0.020) (0.164) (0.109) (0.116) (61.027) (0.887) (0.061) (1.620) (0.381) (0.052) (22.587)
R-squared 0.0016 0.0432 0.0001 0.0040 0.0113 0.0007 0.0000 0.0070 0.0027 0.0028 0.0006 0.0031 0.0019 0.0004
N 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: Unit of observation is individual included in revisit sample. In Panel A, each column presents results from regression of given dependent variable on indicator for days to first disbursement (targeted) <=6 and a constant. Panel B is similar but independent variable 
is interest rate on randomly-chosen choice. Constant term included in each regression but not reported.
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Appendix Table 2: Determinants of Change in ln(c) From Sooner to Later
Ordinary least-squares estimates
Dependent variable: Change in ln(c) from sooner to later
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Interest rate (r)      0.948***      0.949***      0.935***      0.937***
   (0.029)      (0.029)      (0.029)      (0.029)   
Male      0.026        0.024   
   (0.040)      (0.042)   
Age 35 or under      0.061        0.061   
   (0.056)      (0.058)   
36-56 yrs old      0.056        0.041   
   (0.044)      (0.047)   
Some primary school      0.008       -0.012   
   (0.047)      (0.050)   
Primary school     -0.038       -0.087   
   (0.072)      (0.072)   
More than primary school      0.030       -0.010   
   (0.097)      (0.089)   
Have adequate maize      0.020        0.046   
   (0.047)      (0.046)   
log(Baseline wealth)      0.021        0.033** 
   (0.015)      (0.015)   
Words recalled      0.022        0.022   
   (0.014)      (0.015)   
Raven's Tests Correct     -0.027       -0.039*  
   (0.020)      (0.021)   
Financial Literacy Questions Correct      0.020        0.032   
   (0.026)      (0.025)   
Number of relatives in the village      0.005*       0.007** 
   (0.002)      (0.002)   
Constant      0.384***      0.224**      0.414***      0.279** 
   (0.030)      (0.084)      (0.030)      (0.089)   
N       8937         8937         8931         8931   
Adjusted R-squared       0.09         0.09         0.08         0.09   
P-value that all HH characteristics = 0 0.15              0.00
delay of 1 vs. 31 days delay of 61 vs. 91 days
Notes: Data are from baseline sample (for details, see Table 1). Unit of observation is a respondent/choice-pair (10 pairs p
Dependent variable is ln(sooner allocation) minus ln(later allocation) for the given pair. Rates of return to waiting until "later"
rates) take on values of 0.1, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 1.0. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 
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Appendix Table 3: Determinants of revisions toward sooner (using all first-stage choices in measure of present bias)
Ordinary least-squares regressions
Dependent variable: Change in sooner allocation upon revisiting (MK)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Preferences under commitment
Fraction Present Biased, All Interest Rates    286.665**    286.704**    288.292**    286.870**    300.144** 
  (99.115)     (98.648)     (98.901)    (101.714)     (99.220)   
Fraction of all tokens allocated to "sooner"   -611.504***   -621.904***   -603.870**   -616.336**   -624.312** 
 (143.293)    (181.288)    (182.737)    (208.430)    (228.595)   
Indicator: days to first disbursement (targeted) <=6    106.130**    108.715**    111.114**    111.495**    123.182** 
  (49.853)     (50.232)     (50.487)     (50.581)     (50.739)   
Indicator: more elastic in the far time frame    122.927      127.578*     134.100*     133.827*     134.468*  
  (76.574)     (77.377)     (76.689)     (77.155)     (78.120)   
Fraction Present Biased   -198.481     -208.243     -210.636     -210.563     -228.184   
   * Indicator: more elastic in the far time frame  (174.326)    (175.632)    (176.154)    (177.720)    (178.815)   
Financial sophistication
Fraction of Decisions Consistent with Law of Demand    -38.112      -16.931      -17.023      -32.864   
 (176.963)    (177.262)    (177.536)    (178.066)   
Words recalled     -3.169       -2.656       -2.508       -1.080   
  (19.049)     (18.951)     (19.061)     (19.103)   
Raven's Tests Correct    -30.248      -30.899      -31.233      -23.157   
  (28.241)     (28.431)     (28.353)     (28.778)   
Financial Literacy Questions Correct     18.058       16.610       16.426       26.498   
  (28.395)     (28.213)     (28.411)     (28.547)   
Shocks
Death in the family (indic.)     56.708       57.508       46.997   
 (200.094)    (200.230)    (199.304)   
Shortfall in expected hh income (MK)      0.052        0.052        0.049   
   (0.041)      (0.041)      (0.038)   
Social pressure
Spouse minus own allocation to sooner (MK)      0.000        0.000   
       (.)          (.)   
Number of relatives in the village     -0.007        0.016   
   (0.064)      (0.081)   
Rate of return to waiting
Implemented interest rate {.1,.25,.5,.75,1}   -143.004*    -222.189**   -218.912**   -210.226**   -210.377**   -215.207** 
  (78.279)     (80.267)     (80.157)     (80.151)     (80.712)     (81.341)   
Baseline characteristics
Male    125.169**     93.665*      94.254*      97.065*      94.696*      47.834   
  (49.851)     (49.368)     (51.664)     (51.548)     (53.092)     (61.239)   
Age 35 or under    198.798**    175.843**    171.018**    169.068**    168.438**    269.208** 
  (71.742)     (70.408)     (70.608)     (71.099)     (71.659)    (109.609)   
36-56 yrs old    117.670**    100.638*     103.106*     106.326**    105.352*     170.131** 
  (54.887)     (54.126)     (53.527)     (53.690)     (55.520)     (64.376)   
Some primary school    -66.952      -86.414      -81.035      -79.640      -80.233      -37.182   
  (70.212)     (68.346)     (71.568)     (69.926)     (70.310)     (71.616)   
Primary school   -159.166*    -167.474**   -164.183*    -172.907*    -172.882*    -129.103   
  (85.954)     (83.972)     (90.815)     (89.970)     (90.006)     (92.005)   
More than primary school   -215.094**   -235.358**   -223.634*    -227.334**   -227.345**   -155.417   
 (105.964)    (103.978)    (116.170)    (114.814)    (114.695)    (117.392)   
Have adequate maize     35.744       24.945       28.773       25.964       25.092        7.664   
  (56.325)     (54.932)     (55.716)     (56.558)     (57.544)     (57.537)   
Total HH Wealth     -0.122       -0.136       -0.138       -0.143*      -0.143*      -0.139   
   (0.089)      (0.085)      (0.084)      (0.083)      (0.084)      (0.087)   
Controls for:
Spousal characteristics - - - - - Y
R-squared (adj.)       0.02         0.06         0.06         0.06         0.06         0.06   
N        661          661          661          661          661          661   
P-value for test that financial sophistication variables are jointly 0       0.82         0.82         0.82         0.83   
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: Unit of observation is individual included in revisit sample. Spousal characteristics controls are: fraction present biased for all choices, indicators for age category, 
indicators for education category, word recall, ravens score, financial literacy score, and fraction of choices adhering to law of demand.
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Appendix Table 4: Determinants of revisions toward sooner; investigating future bias
Ordinary least-squares regressions
Dependent variable: Change in sooner allocation upon revisiting (MK)
(1)
Preferences under commitment
Fraction Present Biased, Non-Implemented Interest Rates
Fraction "Future Biased", Non-Implemented Interest Rates    132.499   
 (109.337)   
Fraction of all tokens allocated to "sooner"   -452.503** 
 (230.072)   
Indicator: days to first disbursement (targeted) <=6    122.894** 
  (51.276)   
Indicator: more elastic in the far time frame              
Indicator: more elastic in the near time frame     54.314   
  (65.255)   
Fraction Present Biased 
   * Indicator: more elastic in the far time frame
Fraction Future Biased   -164.751   
   * Indicator: more elastic in the near time frame  (189.029)   
Financial sophistication
Fraction of Decisions Consistent with Law of Demand    -25.795   
 (177.881)   
Words recalled      1.647   
  (19.368)   
Raven's Tests Correct    -22.046   
  (29.346)   
Financial Literacy Questions Correct     23.829   
  (28.401)   
Shocks
Death in the family (indic.)     74.866   
 (204.919)   
Shortfall in expected hh income (MK)      0.047   
   (0.038)   
Social pressure
Spouse minus own allocation to sooner (MK)      0.040   
   (0.081)   
Number of relatives in the village      2.069   
   (3.376)   
Rate of return to waiting
Implemented interest rate {.1,.25,.5,.75,1}   -203.520** 
  (82.844)   
Baseline characteristics
Male     62.044   
  (61.747)   
Age 35 or under    279.716** 
 (110.625)   
36-56 yrs old    171.308** 
  (65.380)   
Some primary school    -21.206   
  (72.143)   
Primary school   -113.713   
  (92.404)   
More than primary school   -133.158   
 (119.644)   
Have adequate maize      0.398   
  (57.832)   
Total HH Wealth     -0.126   
   (0.092)   
Controls for:
Spousal characteristics Y
R-squared (adj.)       0.04   
N        661   
P-value of F-test: financial sophistication variables jointly 0       0.87   
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: Unit of observation is individual included in revisit sample. Spousal characteristics control
fraction present biased for all choices, indicators for age category, indicators for education categ
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Appendix Table 5: Determinants of inclusion in revisit sample
Ordinary least-squares regressions
Dependent variable: Indicator for inclusion in revisit sample
Preferences under commitment
Fraction Present Biased, Non-Implemented Interest Rates      0.002   
   (0.036)   
Fraction of all tokens allocated to "sooner"     -0.032   
   (0.097)   
Indicator: days to first disbursement (targeted) <=6     -0.108***
   (0.025)   
Indicator: more elastic in the far time frame      0.000   
   (0.021)   
Financial sophistication
Fraction of Decisions Consistent with Law of Demand      0.001   
   (0.076)   
Words recalled     -0.015*  
   (0.008)   
Raven's Tests Correct      0.019   
   (0.013)   
Financial Literacy Questions Correct      0.005   
   (0.014)   
Social pressure
Spouse minus own allocation to sooner (MK)     -0.000   
   (0.000)   
Number of relatives in the village      0.001   
   (0.002)   
Rate of return to waiting
Implemented interest rate {.1,.25,.5,.75,1}      0.057   
   (0.036)   
Baseline characteristics
Male      0.036   
   (0.030)   
Age 35 or under      0.080*  
   (0.044)   
36-56 yrs old     -0.037   
   (0.031)   
Some primary school     -0.034   
   (0.029)   
Primary school     -0.055   
   (0.045)   
More than primary school     -0.056   
   (0.045)   
Have adequate maize      0.007   
   (0.027)   
Total HH Wealth     -0.000***
   (0.000)   
Controls for:
Spousal characteristics Y
R-squared (adj.)       0.05   
N        722   
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: Unit of observation is individuals targeted for inclusion in revisit sample. Dependent variable has mean 
of 0.916. Right-hand-side variables are identical to column 6, Table 5, except for omission of shock variables 
("death in family" and "shortfall in expected household income"), because shock variables are not available for 
attriters. See Table 5 for other notes.
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Dependent variable: Change in sooner allocation upon revisiting (MK), with missing values replaced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
600 400 200 0 -200 -400 -600
Fraction Present Biased, Non-Implemented Interest Rates 188.075** 188.428** 189.409** 190.389** 191.590** 190.766** 190.480**
(89.646) (87.857) (87.025) (87.127) (87.780) (89.037) (90.643)
Fraction of all tokens allocated to "sooner" -431.017** -431.037** -435.711** -440.386** -472.268** -504.767** -532.108**
(212.525) (209.926) (208.729) (209.229) (210.069) (212.175) (215.454)
Indicator: days to first disbursement (targeted) <=6 190.458*** 166.996*** 143.898*** 120.799*** 102.239** 85.558* 69.613
(47.697) (46.728) (46.253) (46.295) (46.714) (47.520) (48.665)
Indicator: more elastic in the far time frame 118.921 121.014 122.667 124.320* 124.198* 122.206* 119.686
(76.443) (75.305) (74.496) (74.124) (73.996) (74.167) (74.648)
Fraction Present Biased * I: more elastic in the far time frame -201.488 -200.695 -199.093 -197.490 -199.087 -194.141 -188.180
(171.861) (169.208) (167.507) (166.843) (166.775) (167.321) (168.380)
Fraction of Decisions Consistent with Law of Demand -9.292 -18.216 -24.916 -31.617 -29.723 -23.491 -18.644
(167.521) (165.128) (163.775) (163.742) (164.856) (167.153) (170.413)
Words recalled 2.599 0.597 -2.044 -4.684 -7.389 -9.646 -11.951
(18.575) (18.211) (17.955) (17.852) (17.881) (18.031) (18.291)
Raven's Tests Correct -26.198 -23.466 -20.751 -18.036 -13.969 -11.436 -9.015
(27.354) (26.906) (26.629) (26.588) (26.758) (27.067) (27.549)
Financial Literacy Questions Correct 18.682 20.090 22.382 24.674 25.011 24.225 22.637
(26.756) (26.274) (26.002) (26.004) (26.242) (26.669) (27.278)
Spouse minus own allocation to sooner (MK) 0.048 0.048 0.047 0.046 0.042 0.037 0.037
(0.075) (0.074) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) (0.075) (0.077)
Number of relatives in the village 0.904 0.999 1.128 1.258 1.542 1.810 2.027
(3.002) (2.958) (2.954) (2.989) (3.052) (3.134) (3.234)
Implemented interest rate {.1,.25,.5,.75,1} -237.479*** -228.823*** -221.385*** -213.948*** -205.420*** -197.399*** -189.790**
(76.074) (75.169) (74.722) (74.892) (75.447) (76.350) (77.603)
Male 36.907 43.139 49.183 55.226 60.228 65.668 71.304
(57.667) (56.386) (55.688) (55.611) (55.853) (56.536) (57.626)
Age 35 or under 222.553** 233.238** 246.405** 259.572** 274.053*** 284.066*** 293.232***
(104.766) (103.316) (102.463) (102.314) (102.764) (103.725) (105.261)
36-56 yrs old 174.042*** 166.743*** 159.667*** 152.592** 149.573** 148.445** 147.938**
(62.218) (60.697) (59.714) (59.314) (59.488) (60.172) (61.360)
Some primary school -11.283 -18.190 -24.808 -31.427 -36.844 -40.713 -43.337
(69.318) (68.555) (68.185) (68.249) (68.553) (69.288) (70.453)
Primary school -70.667 -83.080 -96.279 -109.478 -116.624 -120.851 -124.711
(88.457) (86.798) (85.851) (85.754) (86.205) (87.199) (88.825)
More than primary school -106.320 -118.121 -129.817 -141.513 -148.054 -149.923 -149.138
(114.271) (113.347) (113.012) (113.342) (114.132) (115.228) (116.509)
Have adequate maize 0.967 0.939 0.897 0.856 0.536 0.386 0.358
(53.242) (52.125) (51.481) (51.379) (51.696) (52.452) (53.559)
Total HH Wealth 0.036 0.012 -0.013 -0.037 -0.064* -0.091*** -0.099***
(0.044) (0.040) (0.037) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.038)
Spousal characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared (adj.) 0.0488 0.0455 0.0431 0.0407 0.0414 0.0428 0.0429
N 722 722 722 722 722 722 722
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: Dependent variable constrained to remain within 0 or 2000 range. Right-hand-side variables are identical to column 6, Table 5, except for omission of shock 
variables ("death in family" and "shortfall in expected household income"), because shock variables are not available for attriters. See Table 5 for other notes.
Assumed value of dep. var. is initial sooner allocation (from 
baseline) plus:
Appendix Table 6: Bounds on bias due to selection into revisit sample
Ordinary least-squares regressions
Preferences under commitment
Financial sophistication
Social pressure
Rate of return to waiting
Baseline characteristics
Controls for:
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Appendix Table 7: Differential effects by gender
Ordinary least-squares regressions
Dependent variable: Change in sooner allocation upon revisiting (MK)
(1) (2)
P-value, F-test of 
equality of male and 
female coeffs. 
Females Males
Preferences under commitment
Fraction Present Biased, Non-Implemented Interest Rates     87.743      199.450*  0.592
 (170.970)    (118.672)   
Fraction of all tokens allocated to "sooner"   -571.908*    -320.799   0.557
 (311.144)    (293.251)   
Indicator: days to first disbursement (targeted) <=6
   100.810      158.428** 0.574
  (74.563)     (70.368)   
Indicator: more elastic in the far time frame     15.146      211.019*  0.208
 (110.801)    (109.072)   
Fraction Present Biased * I: more elastic in the far time frame    154.424     -433.262*  0.108
 (272.822)    (242.459)   
Financial sophistication
  -142.424      125.398   
Fraction of Decisions Consistent with Law of Demand   -142.424      125.398   0.459
 (259.858)    (250.989)   
Words recalled
   -14.072       29.148   0.294
  (25.342)     (32.410)   
Raven's Tests Correct
    20.486      -75.382*  0.098
  (40.829)     (40.900)   
Financial Literacy Questions Correct
    13.736       36.079   0.718
  (49.662)     (36.949)   
Shocks
Death in the family (indic.)    438.137     -247.190   0.097
 (327.464)    (250.228)   
Shortfall in expected hh income (MK)
     0.051        0.038   0.858
   (0.048)      (0.060)   
Social pressure
Spouse minus own allocation to sooner (MK)      0.067        0.031   0.822
   (0.105)      (0.121)   
Number of relatives in the village
     1.602        2.912   0.865
   (6.580)      (4.037)   
Rate of return to waiting
Implemented interest rate {.1,.25,.5,.75,1}   -247.920**   -181.689   0.692
 (122.849)    (113.634)   
Baseline characteristics
Age 35 or under    211.016      288.188*  0.733
 (152.870)    (166.146)   
36-56 yrs old
    53.810      233.604** 0.201
 (116.154)     (78.953)   
Some primary school
  -168.582*     143.000   0.041
  (98.918)    (115.128)   
Primary school
  -296.744*       5.910   0.155
 (172.443)    (124.417)   
More than primary school
  -508.001**    146.502   0.007
 (173.267)    (165.505)   
Have adequate maize
    38.929      -15.836   0.646
  (85.864)     (82.556)   
Total HH Wealth
    -0.339*      -0.040   0.144
   (0.175)      (0.106)   
Controls for:
Spousal characteristics Y Y
R-squared (adj.)       0.06         0.04   
N        325          336   
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: Unit of observation is individual included in revisit sample. Column 1 restricts to females in revisit sample. Column 2 restricts to males in 
revisit sample. See Table 5 for other notes.This	article	is	protected	by	copyright.	All	rights	reserved
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Appendix Table 8: Sample of consistent individuals
Ordinary least-squares regressions
Dependent variable: Change in sooner allocation upon revisiting (MK)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Preferences under commitment
Fraction Present Biased, Non-Implemented Interest Rates    196.385**    195.808**    196.736**    198.033**    214.286** 
  (95.222)     (95.110)     (95.457)     (97.578)     (95.871)   
Fraction of all tokens allocated to "sooner"   -523.457***  -512.533**   -495.282**   -472.658**   -468.704** 
 (144.727)    (183.875)    (185.305)    (208.907)    (228.647)   
Indicator: days to first disbursement (targeted) <=6    107.737**    111.270**    113.743**    113.971**    124.629** 
  (50.162)     (50.508)     (50.763)     (50.890)     (51.040)   
Indicator: more elastic in the far horizon    127.723*     131.860*     138.471*     137.956*     136.351*  
  (76.722)     (77.815)     (77.303)     (77.797)     (78.877)   
Fraction Present Biased * I: more elastic in the far horizon   -200.517     -204.079     -206.583     -207.747     -216.585   
 (175.339)    (177.404)    (178.197)    (180.001)    (180.320)   
Financial sophistication
Fraction of Decisions Consistent with Law of Demand      0.813       21.584       20.991        6.693   
 (177.867)    (178.276)    (178.423)    (178.688)   
Words recalled     -1.384       -0.818       -0.737        0.437   
  (19.274)     (19.169)     (19.287)     (19.275)   
Raven's Tests Correct    -29.722      -30.415      -30.295      -22.245   
  (28.502)     (28.697)     (28.608)     (29.117)   
Financial Literacy Questions Correct     16.379       14.878       14.671       25.197   
  (28.644)     (28.452)     (28.672)     (28.771)   
Shocks
Death in the family (indic.)     62.129       63.379       55.954   
 (203.497)    (203.721)    (202.864)   
Shortfall in expected hh income (MK)      0.053        0.052        0.049   
   (0.041)      (0.041)      (0.038)   
Social pressure
Spouse minus own allocation to sooner (MK)      0.013        0.044   
   (0.064)      (0.081)   
Number of relatives in the village      0.830        1.589   
   (3.489)      (3.382)   
Rate of return to waiting
Implemented interest rate {.1,.25,.5,.75,1}   -143.004*    -230.279**   -227.048**   -217.948**   -216.638**   -222.626** 
  (78.279)     (81.576)     (81.585)     (81.543)     (82.219)     (82.654)   
Baseline characteristics
Male    125.169**    102.197**    103.061**    105.891**    101.623*      57.796   
  (49.851)     (49.639)     (51.948)     (51.810)     (53.367)     (61.461)   
Age 35 or under    198.798**    183.041**    179.567**    177.550**    177.044**    283.013** 
  (71.742)     (70.736)     (70.943)     (71.396)     (71.965)    (109.969)   
36-56 yrs old    117.670**    107.302**    110.236**    113.512**    112.177**    178.055** 
  (54.887)     (54.200)     (53.493)     (53.665)     (55.422)     (64.326)   
Some primary school    -66.952      -81.393      -76.593      -74.929      -75.660      -32.505   
  (70.212)     (68.760)     (72.070)     (70.397)     (70.858)     (72.125)   
Primary school   -159.166*    -164.017*    -160.505*    -169.354*    -170.945*    -126.996   
  (85.954)     (84.113)     (90.934)     (90.073)     (90.245)     (92.344)   
More than primary school   -215.094**   -230.233**   -218.818*    -222.391*    -222.868*    -148.056   
 (105.964)    (105.190)    (118.268)    (116.837)    (116.832)    (119.628)   
Have adequate maize     35.744       21.233       25.514       22.494       20.949        3.560   
  (56.325)     (55.263)     (56.060)     (56.891)     (57.838)     (57.848)   
Total HH Wealth     -0.122       -0.125       -0.125       -0.130       -0.128       -0.124   
   (0.089)      (0.086)      (0.085)      (0.084)      (0.085)      (0.088)   
Controls for:
Spousal characteristics - - - - - Y
R-squared (adj.)       0.02         0.05         0.04         0.05         0.04         0.05   
N        661          661          661          661          661          661   
P-value for test that financial sophistication variables are jointly 0                                 0.84         0.84         0.84         0.86   
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: Unit of observation is individual included in revisit sample. Spousal characteristics controls are: fraction present biased for all choices, indicators for age category, indicators 
for education category, word recall, ravens score, financial literacy score, and fraction of choices adhering to law of demand.
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Appendix Table 9: Structural estimation of individual discount factors
Ordinary least-squares regressions
Dependent variable: Change in sooner allocation upon revisiting (MK)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: All individuals
β (CARA utility function)                                                           -39.356 -39.945 -42.161 -42.509 -34.321 -42.323
                                                                         (41.461) (42.381) (42.699) (42.873) (43.175) (52.425)
Observations                                                663 663 663 663 663 663 663
Adjusted R-squared                                          0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
β (CRRA utility function)                                                         -0.497 -2.316 -4.346 -5.021 2.153 -9.123
                                                                         (41.272) (41.761) (41.937) (42.183) (42.256) (54.184)
Observations                                                663 663 663 663 663 663 663
Adjusted R-squared                                          0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04
Panel B: Consistent individuals
β (CARA utility function)                                                           -47.137 -59.173 -60.143 -59.114 -54.405 -36.899
                                                                         (52.403) (53.935) (54.684) (54.966) (55.905) (65.657)
Observations                                                663 513 513 513 513 513 513
Adjusted R-squared                                          0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
β (CRRA utility function)                                                         -37.19 -53.99 -57.234 -57.313 -50.812 -48.01
                                                                         (52.206) (53.269) (53.270) (53.523) (54.188) (67.965)
Observations                                                663 513 513 513 513 513 513
Adjusted R-squared                                          0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Implemented Interest Rate  Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         
Demographics  Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         
Days to First Disbursement at Revisit (Targeted)   No         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         
Fraction of All Tokens Allocated to Sooner   No         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         
Fraction of Decisions Consistent with Law of 
Demand   No          No         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         
Aptitude Questions   No          No         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         
Shocks   No          No          No         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         
Spouse minus own allocation to sooner (MK)   No          No          No          No         Yes         Yes         Yes         
Number of Relatives in Village   No          No          No          No         Yes         Yes         Yes         
Spouse Characteristics   No          No          No          No          No         Yes         Yes         
Indicator: more elastic in the far time frame   No          No          No          No          No          No         Yes         
Interaction of beta and Days to First Disbursement 
at Revisit (Targeted)   No          No          No          No          No          No         Yes         
Notes: Unit of observation is individual included in revisit sample. In Panel A the sample includes all individuals, while in Panel B the sample excludes  individuals 
that are inconsistent in 3 or more pairs in Table 2. As in Table 5, the dependent variable is the change in sooner allocation upon revisiting (MK). The bottom of the 
table reports the explanatory variables from Table 5 that are included in the regression, although the only coefficient reported is that of the individual discount factor β. 
This discount factor is estimated using NδδS by positing a flexible į-β model with a four period utility function with two curvature parameters, one for each time 
frame. See Online Appendix 3.8 for more details.
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Appendix Table 10: Random vs. real choice 
Ordinary least-squares regressions
Dependent variable: Change in sooner allocation upon revisiting (MK)
Real Simulated Real Simulated Real Simulated Real Simulated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Preferences under commitment
Fraction Present Biased  [0,1] 302.639*** 697.415
(98.564) [ 389.6, 1021.9]
Fraction Present Biased, Non-Implemented Interest Rate 214.286** 34.238
(95.871) [ -268.9, 332.0]
Fraction Future Biased  [0,1] 29.766 -679.544
(114.235) [ -1001.6, -367.0]
Fraction Future Biased, Non-Implemented Interest Rate 132.499 -18.802
(109.337) [ -321.0, 294.0]
Fraction of all tokens allocated to "sooner" [0,1] -523.857** -1957.084 -501.659** -1954.710
(226.975) [ -2756.0, -1159.7] (231.465) [ -2743.4, -1171.1]
Fraction of all tokens allocated to "sooner", non-Implemented -468.704** 86.926 -452.503** 85.534
   Interest Rate (228.647) [ -671.0, 843.6] (230.072) [ -662.7, 827.2]
Indicator: More elastic in the far time frame 116.174 35.188 136.351* 60.365
(77.070) [ -195.2, 269.0] (78.877) [ -166.9, 283.7]
Fraction Present Biased * More elastic in the far time frame -180.327 15.67781
    (177.194) [ -457.5, 479.6]
Fraction Present Biased, Non-Implemented Interest Rate -216.585 -75.382
   * More elastic in the far time frame (180.320) [ -545.2, 378.2]
Indicator: More elastic in the near time frame 69.279 -18.690 54.314 -46.002
(66.777) [ -247.8, 221.1] (65.255) [ -266.9, 180.5]
Fraction Future Biased * More elastic in the near time frame -229.376 -54.583
    (198.535) [ -533.1, 400.8]
Fraction Future Biased, Non-Implemented Interest Rate -164.751 39.472
   * More elastic in the near time frame (189.029) [ -418.5, 478.4]
Financial sophistication
Fraction of Decisions Consistent with Law of Demand -38.007 125.772 6.693 378.397 -134.885 120.780 -25.795 379.639
(178.238) [ -303.3, 549.9] (178.688) [ -69.9, 850.0] (176.775) [ -310.5, 551.8] (177.881) [ -65.7, 840.3]
Social pressure
Spouse minus own allocation to sooner (MK) 0.068 0.005 0.061 0.005
(0.078) [ -0.26, 0.28] (0.079) [ -0.27, 0.27]
Spouse minus own allocation to sooner (MK), non-Implemented 0.044 0.004 0.04 0.004
   Interest Rate (0.081) [ -0.26, 0.26] (0.081) [ -0.26, 0.26]
Rate of return to waiting
Implemented interest rate {.1,.25,.5,.75,1} -213.079*** -1.163 -222.626*** -5.413 -197.844** -1.349 -203.520** -0.920
(81.088) [ -167.3, 167.4] (82.654) [ -180.1, 166.9] (81.285) [ -177.0, 167.2] (82.844) [ -178.5, 171.5]
Controls for Spousal characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 661 661 661 661 661 661 661 661
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: Unit of observation is individual included in revisit sample. The standard error appears below the coefficient in regressions using the real experimental data (odd numbered columns). The 95% 
confidence interval appears below the coefficient of regressions using simulated data in square brackets. All regressions include other baseline characteristics controls that are included in regressions of 
column 6 of Table 5 and of Appendix Table 4. 
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Stage 1:  
Baseline interview 
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t=1 vs. 31 and 
 t=61 vs. 91 
First (“sooner”) 
possible disbursement 
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Second (“later”) 
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possible disbursement 
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Figure 1: Timeline of Interviews, Choices, and Disbursement of Funds 
“Near” period “Far” period 
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Appendix Figure 1: Schematic of the Preference Elicitation Method; Example with r=0.25  
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Appendix Figure 2: Schematic of the Revising Procedure; Example with r=0.25  
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Notes: Initial allocations made in Jan-Feb 2010. Revisions made in Mar-Apr 2010 in a revisit targeted at a randomized 2-16 days prior to date of first 
disbursement in "far" period. (Date of first disbursement in far period is day t=61 from initial visit in Jan-Feb 2010.) N=664. 
Appendix Figure 3: Distribution of Change in Sooner Allocation Upon Revisiting 
0
5.
0e
-
04
.
00
1
.
00
15
.
00
2
.
00
25
D
en
sit
y
-2000 -1000 0 1000 2000
Change in sooner consumption upon revisiting
This	article	is	p tected	by	copyright.	All	rights	 eserved
Au
th
or
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
Appendix Figure 4: Impact of targeted days before disbursement on revisions toward sooner 
Notes: Figure plots coefficient (and 95% confidence interval) on indicator variables for each separate value of days to first disbursement (omitted category 
is 16 days to first disbursement). Dependent variable is change in allocation to sooner upon revisiting (in MK). Other right-hand-side variables are as 
in Table 6, column 6. 
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